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Abstract
JavaScript is a prototype-based, dynamically typed language with scope
chains and higher-order functions. Third party web applications embedded
in web pages rely on JavaScript to run inside every browser. Because of its
dynamic nature, a JavaScript program is easily exploited by malicious ma-
nipulations and safety breach attacks. Therefore, it is highly desirable when
developing a JavaScript application to be able to verify that it meets its ex-
pected specification and that it is safe. One of the challenges in achieving this
objective is that it is hard to statically keep track of the heap-manipulating
JavaScript program due to the mutability of data structures. This thesis fo-
cuses on developing a verification framework for both functional correctness
and safety of JavaScript programs that involve heap-based data structures.
Two automated inference-based verification frameworks are constructed based
upon a variant of separation logic. The first framework defines a suitable sub-
set of JavaScript, together with a set of operational semantics rules, a spec-
ification language and a set of inference rules. Furthermore, an axiomatic
framework is presented to discover both pre/post-conditions of a JavaScript
program. Hoare-style specification {Pre}prog{Post}, where program prog
contains the language statements. The problem of verifying program can be
reduced to the problem of proving that the execution of the statements meets
the derived specification language.
The second framework increases the expressiveness of the subset language to
include this that can cause safety issues in JavaScript programs. It revises
the operational rules and inference rules to manipulate the newly added
feature. Furthermore, a safety verification algorithm is defined.
Both verification frameworks have been proved sound, and the results ob-
tained from evaluations validate the feasibility and precision of proposed
approaches. The outcomes of this thesis confirm that it is possible to anal-
yse heap-manipulating JavaScript programs automatically and precisely to
discover unsafe programs.
Copyright c© 2012 by WEI XIONG.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotations from it should be
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computers were developed in the last century and the computer revolution has grown
to have a huge impact on peoples’ daily lives, computer-based systems play an increas-
ingly significant role across all aspects of human life. People heavily rely on various web
technologies, such as social networking, online shopping, and email. Client-side web tech-
nologies allow users to participate more interactively and collaborate with each other.
For example, a scripting language like JavaScript can be used to upload and download
data from a web server without undergoing a full page reload. However, JavaScript
is double-edged sword. The greater power of the language also brings a greater risk.
JavaScript lacks the maturity of the object-oriented languages, for example, every block
of code shares the same execution priority, the private variables and methods can be ac-
cessed by an outside object, the same code can produce different output under different
browsers. Therefore, the users’ private information and the authority of the web pages
could be breached because of a malicious client-side JavaScript application.
Web applications provide the potential for malicious parties to deliver scripts to run
on a client computer via the web, so that the web registered users’ private information
can be leaked if the web page was compromised or under attack. For example, the social
networking website LinkedIn announced that 6.5 million of its members’ passwords were
1
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posted onto the Internet after the website was compromised on June 2012 (Lin12).
The users’ information were leaked through a breach of log in JavaScript application
that connects to database. Another example, a malicious third party advertisement
exploited The New York Times web site (Newch) in 2009. The New York Times website
included some advertisements from third party advertisers’ servers which changed the
advertisement to take over the entire window/web page (host page) and entice users into
downloading fake anti-virus software.
Since unsafe web applications can bring catastrophic results, a systematic method
is urgently needed to ensure that the developed applications are safe, robust and fulfill
the requirements of users. However, the growth of web applications in terms of size and
complexity make checking this manually almost impossible. Besides, testing is limited
in its test sets to discover latent threats (Dij72). A solution is to develop a framework
based on formal verification approach to verify software, and enhance the quality of web
applications (HM04). The aim of this thesis is to provide a formal method to enhance
the safety of web applications.
1.1 Background
There are various approaches to improve the quality of software, including program
language design, formal specification language design, program testing, model checking,
static analysis and other program analysis techniques and verification.
A design for programming language can avoid certain kinds of programming errors
(JMG+02; CHA+07). For example, the Java language adopted the design of a garbage
collector which eliminates the needs of explicit memory allocation and deallocation that
can prevent program execution from heap space memory exhaustion (Ven99). Another
example is the design of Haskell and OCaml, which eliminate type casting to prevent type
errors from occurring at run time (Jon03; LDG+10). Google developed the Dart language
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to replace JavaScript for enhancing the safety and security of scripting languages (Darge).
However, such an approach cannot guarantee the correctness of programs, and it also
cannot remove the issues that already exist in current languages.
Formal specification is another approach to enhance the quality of programs. It
involves using a specification language to specify the requirement and behaviour of a
program in a rigorous mathematical way. The specification language is usually a higher
level language than the programming language. It creates a foundation during program
analysis and verification to specify the programs for further analysis, such as correctness
analysis of the programs. For example, UML was designed to model applications (Jac99),
CSP describes patterns of interaction in concurrent system as a formal specification
language (Hoa78), CASL is a Common Algebraic Specification language based on first-
order logic with induction (BM04), and the Z specification language is based on typed
first-order predicate logic and produced to describe complex dynamic systems in a smaller
and simpler mathematical way than any programming language can provide (Spi89).
Program testing is a another widely applied and efficient approach to provide infor-
mation about the reliability and quality of software. It is a process of validating and
verifying that the software works as expected or satisfies the needs of stakeholders by
executing programs with certain sets of input values and determining whether the soft-
ware can satisfy the input-ouput specification. The challenge for software testing is in
automatically generating a test set to a high standard (Bez90; HH91). The complexity
of the software makes the completeness of the infinite test cases set impossible (Dij72).
Model-based testing (MBT) provides an approach to analyse the test results instead
of focusing on the test set generation (Liu11). This approach proposes a specification
based upon a formal model to generate expected inputs and outputs. It compares the
actual generated outputs with expected outputs, and is able to decide on further actions
such as modifying the model and generating more tests, or stopping testing and esti-
mating reliability of the software. However, verifying the completeness of the test sets
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is a challenge in software testing. The test sets may improve the degree of the precision
and efficiency of the approach, but it cannot cover certain explicit characteristic of the
program, such as functional correctness and safety.
To overcome the weaknesses of testing, formal verification is proposed to be an-
other path ensuring the qualify of software. It uses mathematical based approaches to
perform the static analysis and verification of programs. Model checking is introduced
to automatically verify the correctness of finite-state systems by an exhaustive explo-
ration of the space of the computation states according to a specification in temporal
logic (CE81; QS82). It uses abstraction techniques to calculate potentially infinite sets
of computation states to finite states. The SLAM 1 model was successfully applied
to Microsoft Static Drive Verifier (BR02; BCLR04). BLAST is a C language program
model checker that employs counterexample guided automatic abstraction refinement
(HJMS03).
Another formal verification approach is deductive logic inference verification. It uses
logic formulas to formally describe the behaviour of programs and interpret program
statements as predicate transformers to reason about program with axioms and inference
rules in axiomatic systems (Flo67; Hoa69).
Static program analysis is used to derive properties of programs in a systematic way.
In contrast to dynamic analysis, it executes program code symbolically based on an
abstract model (NNH99). The abstract model is intended to conceptually derive all
possible states that the program may reach at run time. The soundness of the analysis
then can be proved in a rigorous mathematic way. The algorithms of the analysis are
used to simulate all the possible program behaviours and inputs arising dynamically at
run time, rather than actually executing the program in a computer.
1The SLAM project originated in Microsoft Research in early 2000. Its goal was to automatically
check that a C program correctly uses the interface to an external library.
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1.2 Motivation
JavaScript has become the most widely used language for client-side web program-
ming (RLBV10). The dynamic features and flexible characteristics of the language make
understanding its program codes notoriously hard, and the lack of adequate static analy-
sis tools make it hard to ensure the safety and correctness of its programs. Therefore, it is
highly desirable to develop a framework to formally describe the behaviour of JavaScript
programs and reasoning about them.
The design principles within JavaScript were taken from the Self and Scheme lan-
guage and influenced by the C, Java, Python, and Perl languages. JavaScript follows
certain conventions such as shared mutable data structures which means that one data
structure could be pointed to or referred to by multiple pointers or references. These
pointers or references are alias to each other, and the data structure could be modified
after creation by any access path. This makes JavaScript programs even harder to keep
track of the properties of its data structure statically than Java programs because of
these dynamic features.
The emergence of separation logic (IO01; Rey02) promotes scalable and precise rea-
soning via explicit separation of structural properties over heap memory where recursive
data structures are dynamically allocated. It enables the automated verification and
analysis of heap manipulating programs. Being an extension of Hoare logic (Hoa69),
separation logic is used to verify the functional correctness of programs by modelling
stack and heap memory in a natural and accurate manner. A number of approaches
have been made to automatically verify programs written in mainstream imperative lan-
guages such as C, C++, and Java (CDNQ08; BCO05; NDQC07; RL10; CDNQ10). An-
other advantage of using separation logic is to verify other properties of programs, rather
than just memory safety and functional correctness. For example, the shape property 1
1In Chin et al. (2007), shape property refers to the expected forms of some linked data structures,
such as cyclic lists, doubly-linked list, height-balanced trees and sorted lists trees.
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of linked lists and trees, the length of list and sorted order of list, the height of a tree
and binary search property (CDNQ07; CDNQ08; CDNQ10; LHQ08; NDQC07). Using
separation logic to verify the functional correctness of JavaScript programs has been an
open research problem.
Another motivation of this thesis is to improve the quality of JavaScript client-side
programs. As the programs are executed on the client platform, not only the correctness
but also the safety of the programs are of concern to both the developers and end
users. In this case, the client-side third party applications written in JavaScript may
inject vulnerabilities into the host pages, which becomes a prominent threat. Comparing
with the main stream programming languages, there is no adequate formal system for
verifying the safety of third party JavaScript programs with respect to the host page.
Therefore, the program would be more robust if a framework could also improve the
safety of the program applications.
1.3 Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to increase the level of automation of JavaScript
program verification. The investigated aspects of the programs are functional correct-
ness, and safety of third party application with respect to the host page. This thesis aims
to develop an axiomatic system for verifying JavaScript programs. More specifically, the
goal can be described in detail as follows:
Program Logic The first objective is to develop a program logic to automatically
reason about a broad subset of JavaScript, including challenging features such as
object field modification on the fly, function object, prototype inheritance, and
scope chain. Logical reasoning has much to offer JavaScript, such as a formal
description of program behaviour, and the ability to verify more general properties
of the program, such as safety.
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Unsafe program Discovery The second objective is to infer the precondition and
postcondition of the program state, so that the generated specification can be pre-
cise enough for further analysis. For example, the specification can be progressed
to analyse reachability relationships among objects. After further analysis, the
objects that establish the reachability to the object window will have the ability
to visit all the objects enclosed in the web page could be abstractly defined in a
set. According to analysis of such a set, objects that directly or indirectly take on
the authority of window can be discovered.
1.4 Criteria for Success
This section defines the measures of accomplishment to be used to evaluate this
research, a series of criteria for assessing the success of the research shows as follows:
1. Definition of a suitable and a safe subset of JavaScript
This research will define a suitable subset of JavaScript that can be used in the
formal analysis for functional correctness and safety properties. An extremely
small (trivial) subset would narrow down the range of its application functionality,
whereas full JavaScript features are difficult to be verified using formal methods.
Therefore, this criterion specifies whether the language has the trade-off between
the expressiveness of the subset language and the feasibility with formal method
verification.
Generally, the safety property of a program refers to memory safety. In this thesis,
a program written in the subset of JavaScript is defined to be safe if and only if
the program does not maliciously interfere with the website host, especially the
arbitrary manipulation of global variables on the host.
2. Define Operational and Axiomatic semantics of the JavaScript subset
7
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For a verification framework, the underlying operational semantics must be pre-
sented to fully describe how a valid subset language program is interpreted as
sequence of computational steps in a mathematically rigorous way. The under-
lying axiomatic semantics will be provided to prove the functional correctness of
the subset language programs. The pre-condition and post-condition assertions
written in logical statements will describe the meaning and status of statements
of the program.
3. Definition of safety verification algorithm
A verification framework must construct a specification language that is used to
define predicates to specify program safety properties. The safety property must
be formally defined in a rigorous mathematical way, and a verification algorithm
should be designed to assist users to decide whether or not programs are safe.
4. Proofs of program written in the JavaScript subset
As a verification system, the soundness property is the most fundamental property
that needs to be proved. In this thesis, the system is sound if and only if its
axiomatic inference rules prove only assertions that are valid with respect to its
operational semantics.
8
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1.5 Thesis Organization
This thesis is constructed using 6 chapters including current introduction Chapter 1.
Figure 1.1 displays the interconnection relationships between the chapters. In Figure
1.1, the oval box represents the program verification topic, the diamond boxes represent
properties of the language, and the rectangle boxes represent the reviews and approaches
that have been employed.
Chapter 2 provides the state-of-the-art literature survey of the language features of
JavaScript and program verification techniques, especially focusing on separation logic
inference system, as well as the dynamic features of JavaScript.
Chapter 3 presents a subset of JavaScript, together with an axiomatic framework.
The framework is composed of the operational semantics for strong soundness proof,
the specification language describing the abstract domain, and the inference rules to
automatically deduce the specification of the program states. The aim of this chapter is
to develop a framework for verifying the correctness of the subset language.
Chapter 4 describes an upgraded axiomatic framework based on the one developed
in Chapter 3. The language targeted in this chapter has more expressiveness than the
one in Chapter 3, together with its safety issue. The system proposed in this chapter is
able to verify both functional correctness and safety properties.
Chapter 5 presents the experimental results and evaluation of the axiomatic frame-
work.
Chapter 6 concludes and summarises the contributions of the thesis and discusses
possible directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The discussion of the literature is divided into three parts. Firstly, the features of the
JavaScript language that distinguish it from other programming languages are presented.
A collection of examples are constructed to explain the features individually. Secondly,
the state-of-the-art in the solutions for solving safety problem in JavaScript programs
are introduced. JavaScript is adopted as a script language in a web environment, dif-
ferent web browsers use different JavaScript interpreters. Such diversity causes certain
difference in performance. JavaScript has been widely used to be embedded in HTML
document as third party applications to create dynamic performance. The HTML docu-
ment needs to be protected from the safety issue caused by such applications. Thirdly, a
brief survey of the related work on formal program analysis and verification is discussed.
In particular, the techniques that might be suitable for verifying certain properties of
the JavaScript language are presented.
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2.2 JavaScript as a Scripting Language
In 1995, JavaScript was born for adding enhancements to the behaviour of web pages,
primarily to web forms (Whi08). With the development of the Internet, the support
for various web applications becomes extremely important. JavaScript was designed by
Brendan Eich and developed by Netscape (Fla11). The desirable properties of JavaScript
include that it was originally designed for increasing the interaction between the web
users and web pages, communicate with the browser asynchronously. For example, online
form applications, flash interactions. JavaScript has been implemented in most browsers,
including Firefox, Safari, IE. Its major implementation are KJS, Rhino, SpiderMonkey,
V8, WebKit, Carakan, Chakra. JavaScript was ranked the most popular programming
language on GitHut and StackOverflow (Git12) in 2012.
JavaScript as a web scripting language has been widely used because of its remark-
able expressive dynamic features. It is more productive and efficient to use JavaScript
to construct applications on the client side with certain libraries (AJAX, Prototype,
etc.) instead of using Java language. The comparisons between JavaScript and Java is
employed in this thesis to answer the question of ”what is JavaScript?”. Table 2.1 shows
general difference between JavaScript and Java from the aspects of execution, platform,
web integration, etc. In comparison with Java, JavaScript has weak typing, prototyping
is more concise, it is more suitable for building up small or middle-scale applications.
This section is aim to provide an overview survey of JavaScript. The language features
that are critical and distinct from other languages are chosen for discussion. The main
outcome of this discussion is that JavaScript is powerful but flawed.
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Item JavaScript Java
Compilation
It is not complied but runs interpretively by
client.
It is compiled into bytecode (machine read-only)
downloaded from server. JVM interprets the
code to run on client.
Platform
It runs within browsers that support it. It runs as applets within browsers that support
it. It also can run as a standalone application on
most platforms (Windows, Unix, Linux, etc.).
Web Ability
It can build dynamic webpages (forms, buttons,
etc.) Its code embedded in HTML.
It can build Applet pages. For example, JSP
(Java Server Pages) can build the webpages that
contains HTML and JavaScript. Its applets dis-
tinct from HTML but can be accessed from
HTML pages.
Web Presence
It develops applications efficiently. The down-
loading times of applications in webpages is re-
duced.
Its applets still exist on the web, but costs more
time to perform.
Client Side
It does not allow direct access to a user’s hard-
drive. The source code can be viewed using
”View Source”, indirect source code also can be
viewed by specified an external JavaScript file
(using the SRC attribute).
It does not allow to access to memory or devices
outside the applet except certain action that ex-
plicitly granted by permission. When its applet
are compiled to bytecode and sent to the client
side, the source code is not human-readable.
Programming Language
It is prototype-based. No distinction between
types of objects. Inheritance is through the pro-
totype mechanism, and fields and methods can
be added to any object dynamically.
It is class-based. Objects are divided into classes
and instances with all inheritance through the
class hierarchy. Classes and instances cannot
have fields or methods added dynamically.
Table 2.1: Overview Comparison Between JavaScript and Java
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2.2.1 Main Features of JavaScript
There are three important concepts in JavaScript, objects, functions and closures
(See Figure 2.1). The strong relationship among them builds up the foundations for
any type of JavaScript application development. An object is an unordered collection
of fields, each of which has a name and a value. Objects and fields can be modified at
runtime. JavaScript treats functions as objects. A function can be created at runtime,
stored in a data structure and returned as an argument for another function. In addition,
JavaScript sustains closure, which permits functions intrinsically bound to variables
outside their own scope, even when the scope is no longer visible.
Figure 2.1: Three Important Concepts in JavaScript
2.2.1.1 Data Type and Variable
JavaScript contains a group of data types. The primitive types are boolean, number,
string, null and undefined. The rest are of type object, a function is a type of object.
Type-checking mainly happens at runtime. A variable is not declared with a specific data
type, the type of a variable is determined by the latest value assigned to it. The language
provides the var keyword to declare a variable which can be assigned or have its value
modified at any point in the program. Figure 2.2 shows that variables in JavaScript have
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loose typing and can be modified without any type casting. Unlike, variable declaration
in Java that must be specified with data types and initial value, and a variable cannot
change data type unless forced to by type casting.
2.2.1.2 Object Structure
In JavaScript, an object is an unordered collection of key value pairs. The keys of
objects are fields. Fields are containers for primitive type values and other objects. This
object structure can be specified in a variety of ways. In the case of object literals that
is an object declared with a set of fields and correspondent values.
Figure 2.3 shows an example of how JavaScript declares an object x with fields a, b,
and f in an object literal way. The field a has integer value 10, the filed b is a literal
object that has field c, and the field f is a method of object x. In JavaScript language,
fields are not explicitly defined, and can be added or removed at any time of program
execution. Furthermore, JavaScript allows multiple fields access, for example, x.b.c is
actually two level access. Note that access to non-existent fields in JavaScript would
not generate an error but return undefined value. Attempting to access a field on the
undefined value will result in a runtime error.
2.2.1.3 Functions
A function is a block of JavaScript code which is defined once but might be invoked
several times. A function block definition contains a function name (identifier), a list
of optional parameters, local variables and body of the function. JavaScript functions
have three important properties. First of all, functions are object, as such they have
fields and methods. JavaScript supports first-class functions, which can be assigned
to variables, passed as parameters. Note that any reference to a function allows it to
be invoked using the () operator. Secondly, JavaScript supports nested functions. A
function can define an inner function, the scope of the function includes local variables,
15
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1 <s c r i p t type = ” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2
3 var a = 10 ,
4 b = ” Hel lo World” ;
5
6 a = b ;
7 document .write ( a ) ; //” He l lo World”
8 </s c r i p t>
Figure 2.2: Variables Declaration in JavaScript
1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var x = {
3 a : 10 ,
4 b : { c : 20 } ,
5 f : function ( ) {
6 return ” F i e ld f i s a method . ” ;
7 }
8 }
9 document .write ( x . a ) ; //10
10 document .write ( x . b . c ) ; //20
11 document .write ( x . f ( ) ) ; //” F i e ld f i s a method . ”
12 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.3: Objects Structure in JavaScript
inner function object and parameters. Thirdly, JavaScript supports closure. Since the
creation of a nest function defines a lexical scope, this means that a function can be
executed using the variable scope that was in effect when it was defined, not the variable
scope that is in effect when it is invoked (Fla11). A closure is created when an inner
function has access to the local variables located in the outer function. It is generated
whenever the inner function is returned. For example, in Figure 2.4, the outer function
f contains an inner function g. The return of the inner function generates a closure that
is composed of the scope of function g and the local variable a. Note that, the variable
a is declared outside of the inner function g. Technically, all JavaScript functions are
closures and they have a scope chain associated with them. A function object is also
created with a V ariable Object (VO) that refers to its current execution context. A
V ariable Object can visit its local variables, function expression, and parameters that
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are declared in its context. Variable identifiers are resolved against the scope chain.
The identifier resolution starts with the first V ariable Object in the scope chain. It is
checked to see whether it has a field with a name that corresponds with the requested
identifier. The scope chain is a chain of V ariable Object, if the request identifier can not
be encompassed in the first V ariable Object, the resolution traverses the scope chain to
the next V ariable Object until the identifier is encountered. Note that multiple closures
are allowed and are generated by the same nested function. The closures essentially save
programmers from the need to create global variables all the time as they can keep a
copy of the all the local variables.
In JavaScript, a function is called a method in the case of when a function is created
as a field of an object. Objects can gain methods by assigning a function definition
to a field. There are two ways to define a function in JavaScript (Ecm09), function
declaration and function expression. A function declaration can be translated to a
function expression (See Figure 2.5). The function declaration function f(){......} can
be converted into the function expression var f = function(){......}. In fact, the function
name defined by a function expression can be used only inside the function body, whereas
a function declaration creates a variable with the same name as the function name. Thus,
a function declaration can be accessed by its name in the scope it was defined in. Another
crucial difference is that function declarations are evaluated before the enclosing scope
is executed, but function expressions are evaluated as they are encountered.
2.2.1.4 Prototype and Inheritance
In JavaScript, an object contains a sequence of fields and an internal field [[prototype]]
1 linking to its ”super” object. When fields are accessed from an object by the dot
notation, it returns the value if the field can be found in the current object, otherwise
the field will be examined in ”super” object by following [[prototype]]. The ”super”
1This field is not allowed to be accessed except in certain browser environments, such as Firefox.
Firefox provides variable proto to acquire the authorisation to access [[prototype]] property.
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1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var a = ”Goodbye World” ;
3 var f = function ( ) {
4 var a = ” He l lo World” ;
5 var g = function ( ) {
6 document .write ( a ) ;
7 } ;
8 re turn g ( ) ;
9 } ;
10 f ( ) ; // ” He l lo World”
11 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.4: Closure in JavaScript
1 \\ Function Dec la ra t i on
2
3 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
4 function f ( ) {
5 var a = ” He l lo World” ;
6 re turn a
7 } ;
8 f ( ) ; //” He l lo World”
9 <\ s c r i p t>
1 \\ Function Express ion
2
3 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
4 var f = function ( ) {
5 var a = ” He l lo World” ;
6 re turn a ;
7 } ;
8 f ( ) ; //” He l lo World”
9 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.5: Function Declaration vs. Function Expression
object is the prototype of the current object. If the current object does not contain
the field, the examination follows prototype chain which is linked objects, and return
undefined when the chain of link objects is exhausted. JavaScript uses the prototype
chain to provide inheritance, whereas, in Java, each class is allowed to have one direct
superclass, and each superclass may have an unlimited number of subclasses. In Figure
2.6, the example of the JavaScript shows that the object x is the prototype of the object
y, the object y has the authority to visit the fields that are contained in the object x,
18
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such as the field a and f .
1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var x = {
3 a : 10 ,
4 f : function ( ) { re turn ” He l lo World” ;}
5 } ;
6 var y = { a : 20 }
7
8 y . p r o t o = x ;
9
10 y . a ; //20
11 y . f ( ) ; //” He l lo World”
12
13 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.6: Inheritance in JavaScript
In addition, JavaScript makes no distinction between constructors and other func-
tions. Every function gets a prototype property that is used to store all the fields that
the function’s instance can inherit from. Figure 2.7 shows that a field y can be added
to function object f by .prototype notation on the fly. This statement provides any
instance of object f an additional field y. The notion of prototype and [[prototype]] is
not well defined. Table 2.2 shows the difference between them.
1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var f = function ( x ) {
3 t h i s . x = x ;
4 }
5 var g = new f ( ” He l lo ” ) ;
6 g . x ; //” He l lo ”
7 f . prototype . y = 10 ;
8 g . y ; //10
9 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.7: Inheritance of Function Object in JavaScript
Moreover, prototype is one of the function object properties that can be applied for
fields inheritance, whereas [[prototype]] is an internal and hidden property pointed to
an actual prototype (as superclass in Java). Note that, in Table 2.2, getPrototypeOf()
is an object property to check whether the object owns a field, constructor is set to
19
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the function’s prototype property at function creation. Object.prototype is the actual
prototype of the object Function.prototype, and they can be distinguished by their
dissimilar internal properties.
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Table 2.2: Dot prototype vs. Dot [[prototype]]
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2.2.1.5 Other Conventions
There are some other features of JavaScript that need explanation.
• Execution Environment
JavaScript codes rely on an execution environment to be embedded in or to be
included in HTML pages, which is able to perform interactions with the Document
Object Model (DOM) of the page (Ecm09). The code should be either stored in
public (the HTML document) or delivered as a .js external file, and they are
interpreted by an interpreter in the browser on the client-side. In addition, the
interpreters treat unassigned variables, unassigned object fields, functions that do
not have return statement as undefined. The value null is a type of object that
represents object value and the interpreters return null when a variable is set to
an empty value.
• Pass By Value or Reference
In JavaScript, functions parameters are passed either by value or reference. It
depends on the type of the parameter, passing by value if they are primitive type
and passing by reference otherwise. In the case of passing by value, the action
has no effect on the original variables, whereas if the parameters are passed by
reference, the action on them actually copies in the records referred by the reference
and also copies out when the operation of the function is finished. It means that
the modification of such kind parameters changes their records referenced (values)
by the locations.
• Metaprogramming
JavaScript allows code to be represented as strings and executed. For example,
Figure 2.8 shows that a sequence of code is assigned to variable prog as type string,
the execution of eval function cause the execution of the sequence of code. The
eval function is used to execute JavaScript expression, statement, or sequence
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of statements. The variables declared in a eval function is considered as global
variables. The codes passed to the eval is executed with the privileges of the
interpreters. Thus malicious codes can be executed within the code that passed to
the eval.
1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var prog = ”x=10;y=20;document . wr i t e ( x∗y ) ” ;
3
4 eva l ( prog ) ; //200
5 <\ s c r i p t>
Figure 2.8: Metaprogramming in JavaScript
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Figure 2.9: Overview of Web Browser Implementation
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2.2.2 Client-Side JavaScript
JavaScript mainly allows programmers to write programs to perform computations
in the client side (the user’s Web browser). JavaScript is not originally designed for
interacting with a database on the serve. In Figure 2.9, the process of how a Web browser
retrieves, presents, and translates contents on web pages is shown. In the step one ([1]),
the end users give valid web address in the context of the web browser. The step two
([2]) process sends the request to the server through the firewall. Note that, the server
owns the original web content and the database. After that, the Web browser downloads
the requested web content back from the server in step three ([3]). Then the browser
scans the web content (document), and delivers the revised web content to the end user
which has been ”translated” into human readable form in step four ([4]). Inside the
Web browser, internal engines such as a rendering engine and a JavaScript interpreter
are responsible for the ”translation” process.
Each browser has its individual JavaScript interpreter. The first JavaScript inter-
preter SpiderMonkey, was created at netscape for the Navigator Web browser (KK97)
and implemented using the C language. Mozilla constructed the Rhino engine which
was developed in Java (Rhiva) for interpreting JavaScript programs. The existing in-
terpreters include TraceMonkey in Firefox (Trane), V8 in Chrome (V81ne), Carakan
in Opera (Carom), JavaScriptCore (also named Nitro) in Safari (Nitit). As these in-
terpreters were developed under different semantic model definition, they may return
different output when executing the same piece of of JavaScript program.
The primary objective of a web browser is to display HTML documents in a window.
The execution environment of the HTML document is considered as a global execution
context. In the context of the client-side JavaScript, the window object represents the
reference of the global object in the global execution context with respect to client-side
programming (Ecm09). It has the authority of manipulating arbitrary properties and
methods in the context of the HTML document (DomOM). Therefore the permission
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to access the window reflects the permission to manipulate all the global variables.
In addition, JavaScript also has an influence on third party application development
in a web page (host page). A web page may host more than one piece 1 of JavaScript
code, any such piece could be used to publish advertisements or widgets 2 that are
maintained by third parties. Therefore, a malicious third party who has the authority
to access the window object is able to compromise the entire host page. In such a case,
the piece of third party code (guest code) is not safe with respect to the host page.
To solve this safety issue, several mainstream approaches have been introduced, includ-
ing developing new languages, restriction rewriting and wrapper − based isolation,
sandbox virtual machine, and statically verified containment. They are explained as
follows:
Developing New Languages JavaScript language is in full of problems, including un-
safe and insecure. An intuitive solution is developing a brand new language that
performs the same functionality and more robust than JavaScript. Google pub-
lished a DART language aiming to replace JavaScript on the Web ultimately.
The interesting features it supports are optional static typing and single inheri-
tance (Darge). Essentially, DART is intended to solve the fundamental flaws of
JavaScript including memory leak and safety breaching, whilst providing better
performance.
The problem of developing a new mature language would cause hugh barrier for
adoption.
Restriction Rewriting and Wrapper-based Isolation This approach defines safe
subsets of JavaScript which blacklists some features of the language that are con-
sidered as dangerous, rewrites the rest of the features, and wraps the guest code
1A block of JavaScript starts from the tag <script type=”text/javascript”> and end at the tag
</script>.
2A widget is a programmed HTML fragment with some script. That script can manipulate the
HTML fragment but not be able to manipulate any other part of the document.
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into an enclosed function.
Caja is a project developed by Google (Cajer). It enforces the untrusted guest code
to be executed by a runtime check framework. Caja uses an object−capability security
model to allow a wide range of flexible polices that are intended to make the guest
code safer with respect to the host page. In this model, the objects can only
be changed through the references they hold, objects can only receive references
through methods calls, objects never start with references, the use of functions as
objects is forbidden and encapsulation is enforced. This model encapsulates the
JavaScript codes into a single JavaScript function with no free variables. However
the problems with Caja are that it does not guarantee any particular safe fields
and the rewriting process may cause massive workloads and the runtime cost.
Another example of using rewriting approach is that of Facebook which defines the
FBJS language to develop integrated JavaScript applications on the Facebook web
page. FBJS is subset of HTML and JavaScript (Fbjpt). Essentially, it removes
certain safety-critical constructs (such as eval, Function, constructor), rewrite
others (such as this) to permit them to be used safely, and enforce various wrapped
DOM functions to provide control to the DOM objects. The FBJS library is
applied to attach namespaces for objects in the guest code. However, a safety
issue was found by Maffeis et al. (MMT09b; MMT09a) in 2009. The issue shows
that an object with no capability to modify native objects can indirectly gain such
capability without being granted by the host page. For example, an assignment
of the reference Obj.toString to a new object which Obj was defined in advance.
The new object obviously can manipulate the function toString() that is one of the
methods of the native object Object.prototype. There are still more vulnerability
issues that need to repaired in FBJS (MMT10).
The BrowserShield (RDWD07) system was built to perform dynamic instrumenta-
27
2.2 JavaScript as a Scripting Language
tion of embedded scripts and employ the vulnerability-driven filtering policies for
customised runtime activities. It rewrites the web pages and embeds JavaScripts
into safe equivalents that contain logic for recursively applying runtime checks
to keep modifying content based on known vulnerabilities. However, this system
suffers from massive runtime overhead, and a systematic way of guaranteeing the
correctness of the enforced policies has not been provided.
Guarnieri and Livshits (GL09) stated that the GateKeeper system provides a
mostly static approach for enforcing safety and reliability policies for JavaScript
programs. However, the language they focused on is less expressive than others
work (MMT10; Fbjpt; Cajer; RDWD07).
In fact, the restriction rewriting and wrapper − based Isolation approach may
cause incompatibility problem and increase the difficulties of the connection be-
tween two different isolation systems that are built on the different versions of
JavaScript.
Sandbox Virtual Machine In comparison with Java, JavaScript does not have any
built-in sandbox mechanism 1. ADSandbox (DHF10) was introduced to execute
embedded JavaScript within an sandbox environment and record a log of crit-
ical actions. Before the web content is displayed in the browser, the browser
invokes a Browser Helper Object that can hand over the website URL to an
Dynamic Link Library (DLL). This DLL downloads the web content from the
requested web page in order to analyse it. The analysed result is recorded in a
log, and the users would be navigated to an error page if any suspect action is
detected. The sandbox virtual machine provides a technically sound approach to
permit backward compatibility with current APIs.
Statically Verified Containment To protect the host pages from malicious third
1A sandbox mechanism provides a set of resources for unverified third party programs to run in. It
is used to executed untested codes.
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party applications, one promising approach is statically verifying the JavaScript
programs in terms of the properties that keep the host pages safe. ADsafe (Crong),
Dojo Secure (Dojit), and Jacaranda (Jacty) are existing JavaScript verifiers. The
verification is based on a subset of the target language. The main idea of this ap-
proach is blacklisting known dangerous fields or properties that would breach the
given policies, including accessing global variables (such as document), dangerous
internal properties (such as @constructor), and allowing unverifiable constructs
(such as eval). For example, ADsafe removes the features that cause capability
leakage, it blocks the guest code from directly or indirectly accessing any global
variables, such as the variable this. The variable this is bound to the global ob-
ject window when a method is invoked as a function. It can implicitly access the
object window. More details about ADsafe are discussed in Section 2.2.3. Note
that only untrusted guest code needs to conform to the subset ADsafe, the code
from the trusted third party has access to the entire JavaScript language. This
approach has no measurable runtime cost and no extra rewrite workloads, and it
is compatible with independent tools.
The limitation of this approach is that it can only protect host page from guest
code, but cannot protect guest code from host page. Meanwhile, the expressive-
ness of the language is reduced when certain features of the language is removed.
Furthermore, the renting portion of the host page also could be resold to another
advertisement network, which makes host page even harder to protect. In fact,
the existing safe subset containments still show that they fall short of defending
against capability leaks. In the case of adding a method to the built-in prototypes
for a certain purpose in host page, the malicious guest code which observes this
method can use its capability to breach the containment and compromise the host
page.
Finifter and Barth (MWB10) provided an improved solution. They whitelist known
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safe fields using namespaces to prevent capability breach. Their solution instru-
ments the browsers to load guest code and host page in separate heaps. The
variables on these heaps are marked as vetted. The breach of the guest code can
be detected when the instrumented browsers detect a suspicious reachability edge
from the different heaps. The Blancura V erifier, an extension of ADsafe contain-
ment, whitelists all the loaded variables with two different namespaces attached
for identifying which heap a variable is from. Thus, none of the functions cre-
ated previously by the built-in objects from the host page are accessible by the
guest code. The advantage of using this approach is no extra rewriting workloads.
Adding prefix namespace to the variables does not measurably affect the runtime
performance. However, it is difficult to exploit all suspicious reachability edges,
and not all suspicious edges are intended to breach the containment. The subset
language is even more restrict than ADsafe.
2.2.3 ADsafe
ADsafe defines a subset of JavaScript which permits host page to publish guest
codes and perform valuable interactions, such as third party scripted advertising or wid-
gets. Meanwhile, it can prevent malicious attacks or intrusion from guest codes. JSLint
(Jslnt) provides the ADsafe subset language program a validation mechanism (only syn-
tax checking) to release the inspection burden off a human’s shoulder and review guest
codes for safety checking. ADsafe relies on static analysis. It does no runtime check-
ing or code rewriting, and it requires no program transformations. Essentially, it adds
capability discipline by removing features that cause capability leakage, including that
limited access to primitive type variable except null and undefined as those variables
are global variables or can be linked to them. Another deleted feature is the use of this
as when a method is invoked as a function, this is bound to the global object window.
For example:
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var a = {b : function(){return this; }};
var test = a.b;
test(); //window
In the above example, this is an internal variable in every function object. When
the method b is called as a function such as a.b() in the global environment, the value
of this is bound to the global object window. Another more complicated example is
shown below:
var a = {b : function(){
var c = function(){return this; }
return c();
}};
alert(a.b()); //window
This example presents the function invocation a.b() in this program still returns this
to window. As you can see, both example explain the potential dangerous of using
variable this. Other main prohibited features in ADsafe are shown as follows:
• eval - The eval function can access the global object.
• with - The with statement can modifies the scope chain which increases the diffi-
culty of static analysis.
• Dangerous Properties - Words which cannot be used are apply, arguments, prototype,
callee, caller, constructor, stack, unwatch, valueOf , and watch. Because the use
of those variable names are able to cause capability leakage in some browsers.
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• Words starting with ” ” cannot be used. Because some browsers recognise dan-
gerous properties or methods having a trailing ” ”.
Figure 2.10: ADsafe Structure in HTML Document
Furthermore, the ADsafe subset prevents guest codes from accessing the global vari-
ables or the Document Object Model (DOM) elements directly. This mechanism sim-
plifies the safety control for the host page with respect to the guest codes by enforcing
the scripts to access an ADSAFE object which is provided by host page, and offering
indirect access to the guest code’s DOM elements. Figure 2.10 shows that a widget is
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generated in a HTML document with the name ”TEMPLATE ”, and the codes for the
widget is wrapped in the function ADSAFE.go(..., function(dom, lib)){...}. The guest
codes in this block can access the document through the dom parameter, permitting it
indirectly access to HTML elements and allowing it to modify content, styling and be-
haviour. The parameter lib allows it to access the library file. The library file adsafe.js
is a AJAX library that provides the widget with limit access to DOM.
In fact, ADsafe does not provide a mechanism to guarantee the program to be safe.
A malicious third party can redefine the existing adsafe.js library to breach the safety
feature of the sandbox. ADsafe can only protect host page from guest codes, but it
cannot protect guest codes from host page. This is why we need a logic proof system to
provide a more precise and accurate framework.
2.2.4 Summary
The flexibility of the JavaScript language was presented by the explanation of its
main features. The issues caused by these features contain memory leak, capability
leak, and safety beach:
• Memory leak. A memory leak issue happens when an object of the JavaScript
program that is stored in memory cannot release corresponding memory after the
execution is finished.
• Capability Leak. When a variable from guest code is able to perform the capability
of built-in objects that are located in host pages, meanwhile the host pages have
the new properties of these built-in object created in advance, this scenario may
cause a capability leak.
• Safety Breach. An untrustworthy third party JavaScript application may breach
the protections on host pages by using a malicious operation. For example, a third
party application that maliciously manipulates the this variable can gain access to
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the window object, which has the ability to access all the global variables. Even of
the third parties’ trust is established, the malicious syndicated third parties also
can breach the trust establishment and cause indirectly damage to the host page.
The approach to prevent such damage is building up a verification framework for
detecting the malicious behaviour and improving the safety of the host page.
2.3 Formal Verification
Formal verification provides a foundation for the techniques that are used to build
a mathematically rigorous model for a complex system (Har02). A complex system
requires more accurate analysis and quality guarantee. It is possible to improve reliability
of a system by verifying certain properties of the system. Formal verification has been
proposed to reason about the quality of softwares since 1960s (Hoa69; Flo67).
Perlis and Backus (PS58; BBG+60) introduced the ALGOL that was proposed to be
an universal language for describing programming languages by notations. McCarthy
(McC63) applied ALGOL to introduce meaning of programming languages based on
evaluation of recursive functions. Floyd (Flo67) proposed the way of adding assertions
to flowcharts of programs rather than by using ALGOL, in such way that a rigorous
standard is established for proofs about programs, such as proofs of functional correct-
ness. The assertions he developed can be assigned conditions at each branch and entry
point in the flowcharts of programs. The conditions referring to the value of variables
ensure that if these conditions were true upon entry, thus they can be proven true at
exit. The proof of correctness of programs is rested on the proof that a program satisfies
its specification. Hoare (Hoa69) made two additional steps upon Floyds work. Firstly,
he discarded the flowcharts and developed a axiomatic system for reasoning about pro-
grams using specifications of statement behaviour that have become known as Hoare
Triple, which is composed of three parts, P C Q, the precondition P, the statement C,
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and the postcondition Q. Secondly, he argued that the axiomatic system could be viewed
as an abstract foundation of recording the semantics of programming languages. This
has the profound effect of opening up a way of developing provable programs rather than
viewing their verification as a post hoc concern.
The process of software verification consists of numerous techniques and tools, of-
ten used in combination with one another (Col98). Program verification refers to the
process of determining whether or not the products of a given phase of a software de-
velopment process fit the requirements or purpose that established during the previous
phase (IEE83). In fact, abstract data types, operational semantics, axiomatic semantics,
specification languages all draw on formal verification(How87). There are two main as-
pects in formal verification, verification techniques and formal frameworks. A verification
technique is applied to reason about desired property in a program with a correspond-
ing implementation. The possible techniques are model checking, automata theoretic
techniques, automated theorem proving (CM99). Formal frameworks (CM99) contain
specification language that is used to describe the desired property of a program. The
language can be developed under temporal logic (BR01; Eme81; Pnu77), predicate logic
(BMMR01; CDNQ10), Hoare logic (Flo67; Hoa69), and Separation logic (GMS12). A
formal framework also consists of a set of axioms and inference rules with theorems to be
proved. The existing formal frameworks include interactive theorem prover Coq (Coqnt),
the proof assistant Isabelle (Isant), the mechanical theorem prover ALC2 (Alc50), and
a separation logic based verification framework Smallfoot (BCO05). These frameworks
allow the expression of mathematical assertions and mechanically checks proofs of these
assertion. Proof of program correctness is a technique attempting to identify program’s
faults or errors that cause failures (Col98). Floyd and Hoare had two foundational pa-
pers for program verification (Flo67; Hoa69). They introduced the concept of proof of
correctness that composed of partial and total correctness and built up the logical base
of program verification.
35
2.3 Formal Verification
2.3.1 Model Checking
The notion of performing software verification with logic model checking techniques
has evolved from intellectual curiosity to applicable technology (HJG08). Model checking
has been researched for a number of years (CGP99) and achieved great success in circuit
design and implementation in 1992 (McM92). It was originally introduced by Clarke and
Emerson (CE81), later by Sifakis (QS82). It was designed to verify finite-state systems by
exhausting the entire set of computation states according to some specification described
in temporal logic. Essentially, the verification is converted to a formulae for satisfaction
checking, µ |= φ, where µ is a finite model in an appropriate logic for representing the
system, the specification is represented by the formula φ and the verification method
refers to compute whether or not the model µ satisfies φ (µ |= φ) (HR04). The checking
procedure is completely automatic and fast, and it will either terminate with answer
true or give a counterexample execution to show why the model does not fulfils its
intended purpose. A true answer means the model satisfies the specification (CGP99).
The techniques for applying model checking are temporal logic (Pnu77), abstraction
(BMMR01) and counter example refinement (CGJ+00; CGJL03). Temporal logic was
proposed for reasoning in computer programs (Bur74; Kro77; Pnu77). Pnuili (Pnu77)
was first to use temporal logic for reasoning about program properties from a set of
axioms that described the behaviour of the statements in that program. The introduction
of a temporal logic model checking algorithm was original in the early 1980s by Clarke
(CGP99) and Emerson (Eme81).
A model checker proposed by Braghin et al. (BSB07), was introduced to formalize
and automatically verify the mobile system programmed in JavaScript. Their model
checking engine takes the abstract programs that are pre-processed by the original pro-
grams and a set of security policies as an input, and provides a configuration document
that describes whether or not the current input violates the given policies as an output.
This work enables the specification of generic security policies for JavaScript programs
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to make access control and information flow policies possible to be defined.
2.3.2 Hoare Logic and Verification
Hoare logic sets up a logic foundation framework for program verification (Flo67;
Hoa69). It uses logical formulae to depict the behaviours of the programs, and in-
troduces an axiomatic method that consists of a set of axioms and inference rules for
rigorously deductive reasoning the static functional correctness proofs of programs math-
ematically. The essence of Hoare logic is the Hoare triple {P}C{Q}. Both P and Q
are logic assertions at specific program point. P is a precondition, Q is a postcondition
and C stands for the program statement, such as assignment, function invocation and so
on. Moreover, Hoare logic used Floyd’s (Hoa69) to define axiomatic semantics for pro-
gramming language as a proof system. The axiomatic semantics mathematically define
the semantic of a statement in a program by describing its effect on assertions. When
the precondition P is met, the statement C establishes the postcondition Q. The cor-
rectness of a program reduced to reason about individual statements. Hoare logic only
support partial correctness which means that the functional correctness of programs can
be proved not including program termination. If C is executed in an assertion initially
satisfying P and it terminates, then the final assertion satisfies Q.
A later work (Bur74) integrates operational semantics into Hoare logic for assisting
on the soundness proof of a formal framework . Manna and Pnueli (Hoa69; tTCoP)
stated that soundness of a formal framework is a fundamental property expected to be
proved. Slonneger and Kurtz (SK95) declared that formal framework constructed as an
axiomatic system is sound under given semantics with respect to underlying semantics.
The operational semantics provide an underlying semantics in the form of a set of op-
erational semantic rules to describe how a valid program is interpreted as a sequence
of computational steps. The operational semantics is classified into two categories,
structure operational semantics (small-step semantics), which formally describe how
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the individual steps of a computation take place, and natural semantics (big-step se-
mantics), which describes how the overall results of the executions are obtained. More-
over, underlying semantics refers to a concrete model which indicates the validation of
the language that is to be verified. The language can be a core of Java, C or JavaScript.
Plotkin (Plo81; Plo04) firstly introduced Plotkin style structural operational semantics
(SOS) for defining the behaviour of a program in a structural approach. This approach
contains a significant amount of information details that describes the semantics of a
program in terms of transition relation in the way of a higher level understanding the
program. A set of transition rules define the valid statement transitions. For example,
< x, {x 7→ 3, y 7→ 2} > −→ < 3, {x 7→ 3, y 7→ 2} > represents the application on variable
evaluation rule. It shows that the evaluation of the variable x in the program state
{x 7→ 3, y 7→ 2} will update or remain the state with the assignment x = 3. A number of
research (Win93; Rey98; Ros98; Sch00) showed that SOS has become a popular method
for describing language semantics in program verification. Colvin and Hayes (CH11)
proposed a different method which the transition arrows are labelled by the behaviour
associated with the corresponding step. For example, x
x=2−−→ 2. Their labelled style
operational semantics are able to describe the program semantics more abstractly and
intuitively especially for concurrent programs. Middelkoop et al. (MHK04) employed
a separation logic style operational semantic to deal with the feature of dynamic func-
tion invocations and field updates in Object Oriented Languages. Their method more
accurately describes the status of stack and heap in the transactions. For example,
< x = 2, (s, h) >  ((s | x → 2), h) shows that the execution of the assignment
x = 2 extends the stack with x → 2 after the transition. The objective of operational
semantics is to present the correctness of the implementation of the language in a formal
framework.
The correctness proof of program relies on given semantics in a formal framework
that refers to an abstract model which uses assertions to describe the meaning of a
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statement in a specification language. A specification language is generated to describe
the program at a higher level than a programming language. It can be constructed on
algebraic structures and Hoare logic, which consists of a collection of sets of data types
and statements. This abstract model takes the validation level to verification level which
is able to prove program properties formally.
2.3.3 Separation Logic and Verification
For modelling the complexity of program memory state, separation logic can strengthen
the applicability and scalability of program verification for imperative programs by using
shared mutable data structures (Rey00; Rey02; Rey05). Separation logic is an extension
of Hoare logic, it remains the use of Hoare tripes to describe individual program states.
Hoare triples asserts that if the program C executes from an initial state satisfying the
precondition P , then the program will not go wrong and if it terminates, then the final
state will satisfy the postcondition Q. Note that C might only access the memory loca-
tions whose existence is asserted in the precondition or that have been allocated by C
itself.
In addition to the standard rules from Hoare logic, separation logic supports sep-
aration conjunction * and spacial implication –*. The formula ∆1 * ∆2 asserts that
two heaps described by ∆1 and ∆2 are domain-disjoint, while ∆1 –* ∆2 asserts that if
the current heap is extended with a disjoint heap described by ∆1, then ∆2 holds in
the extended heap that describes the final state. Such connectives are supported by a
low-level storage model based on both stack and heap memory. In this model, four sets
are assumed: Loc of memory locations, Val of primitive values (with 0 ∈ Val denoting
null), Var of variables (program and logical variables), and ObjVal of object values
stored in the heap, with f1 7→ v1, ..., fn 7→ vn denoting an object who has fields f1, ..., fn
with values v1, ..., vn. Then a concrete memory state h, s, consisting of heap and stack,
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is from the following concrete domains:
h ∈ Heap = Loc→fin ObjVal
s ∈ Stack = Var→ Val ∪ Loc
Separation logic based model supports the basic program operations such as lookup,
update, allocation and deallocation with a series of Hoare logic style reasoning rules.
The frame rule enables local reasoning possible in a formal framework. This allows the
reasoning only follows the footprint of the program.
Figure 2.11 shows the base of local reasoning. Two domain disjointed heap P and
R, Q and R. When the execution of the program statement C does not manipulate the
state on the heap R, which means that the set of program variables modified by C do not
share elements with the program variables describes in the state R, then the program
verification refers to {P ∗R}C{Q∗R} can be concentrated on program footprint (the heap
that the program actually manipulates) verification {P}C{Q}. This rule significantly
reduces the scalability of program verification in terms of program state description.
Smallfoot (BCO05) is the first separation logic based formal framework. It is de-
signed for checking the assertions of sequential and concurrent programs that manipu-
lates dynamically allocated data structures. However, this framework concentrates on
the verification of programs written in one specification language. Tuerk (Tue09) pro-
posed a formal framework inside Higher-order logic 1 theorem prover that expresses dif-
ferent flavours of separation logic and makes it instantial for different programming lan-
guage. The implementation of this framework is similar to Smallfoot. A HIP/SLEEK
(NDQC07) formal framework was developed to automatically verify the functional cor-
1Higher-order logic refers to quantification over properties and predicates rather than just object.
For example, a higher-order sentence ∀x ∀P (x ∈ P ∨ x /∈ P ) denotes that for every individual x and
every set P of individuals, either x is or is not an element of the set P. The set P is the property and x
is an object.
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{P} C {Q} modified(C) ∩ vars(R) = ∅
{P ∗ R} C {Q ∗ R}
where modified(C) denotes the program variables modified by C, and vars(R)
represents the set of free variables in R.
Figure 2.11: Frame Rule in Separation Logic
rectness of heap manipulating programmes. HIP is a separation logic based verification
system for a imperative language and able to verify the assertions of individual program
state written in a specification language. SLEEK is a fully automatic prover for taking
a set of separation logic proof in the form of formula implications as input and decides
the functional correctness of a program with a set of axioms and inference rules. A
program logic based on separation logic for JavaScript has been presented by Gardner
et al. (GMS12). Separation logic provides their work a way of modelling challenging
features of JavaScript such as prototype inheritance.
2.3.4 JavaScript Program with Formal Framework
The dynamic features of JavaScript make the JavaScript programs a challenge to be
verified. The third party applications of JavaScript on the Web indicates that there are
two essential properties of the program required to be verified: functional correctness
and safety of host codes. The definition of the functional correctness property is about
a program operating correctly in response to its input/output. For each valid input, it
produces the correct output. The definition of safety of host codes, is that the ability
of third party applications mash-up to operate without causing failure regarding to
web pages dependability. Moreover, a third party application (guest codes) cannot
maliciously interfere with the host page (host codes) where it is located.
Recent research (Cro08; Crong; Fla11) shows that JavaScript web applications can
run improperly in some circumstances and web pages suffer from attacks for years. The
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vulnerabilities of a web browser (CMS+07; RDWD07) or a runtime attack (HYH+04;
KKKJ) may directly harm a host page or registered users through certain malicious at-
tacks, such as drive-by download (MBGL06), cross-site scripting (FGH+07), web privacy
attack (BBN07).
A number of verification techniques and formal framework were developed to verify
JavaScript programs. Yue et al. (YW09) declares the demand of safety verification
in JavaScript applications. They presented a measurement study on unsafe JavaScript
applications on the Web and provided an analysis results to indicate that it is necessary
to ensure safety of these applications.
Temporal logic technique that model checking used for automatic verification hardly
model the dynamic features of JavaScript (BSB07; HJG08) and state explosion problem
(McM92) makes model checking suffer to scale to large JavaScript programs verification.
A formal framework (AB04) based on Hoare logic was proposed to model safety property
in a model checking system (TA05). They used information flow technique (GM82) and
categorised the variables in JavaScript programs into high security and low security
variables to ensure that low security variables do not flow to the critical operations that
involves high security variables. Unfortunately, these frameworks cannot be applied to
verify JavaScript programs because they highly rely on underlying type structure and
JavaScript is a weak type language.
Although ECMAScript (Ecm09) provides a 200 page standard for explaining the
syntax and semantics of JavaScript in the form of prose and pseudocode, this standard
is too informal to be a foundation of formal verification.
Maffeis et al. (MMT08) presented a 30 pages standard that conforms to the EC-
MAScript standard with an abstract syntax of core JavaScript and a set of operation
semantics rules. Guha et al. (GSS10) introduced a drastically different way to focus
on the core of JavaScript and desugar the syntax of the language into a λJS semantics.
Their semantics are more conventional and simpler than the semantics presented by
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Maffeis et al, for example they use substitution instead of scope objects.
Yu et al. (YCIS07) proposed a framework to implement verification based on another
subset of JavaScript, CoreScript. CoreScript is an imperative subset of JavaScript
without the statements on function operations. However, the operational semantics
they provided are inappropriate for safety proofs.
In fact, there are various subset languages proposed as a foundation of JavaScript
language verification. Anderson et al. (AGD05) developed a substantial subset JS0
for building up a type inference system. But their subset does not contain prototype
and function features. Heidegger and Thiemmna (HT09; JMT09) included these two
essential features, but omit assignment statement into their new type system. For con-
structing a subset language in a formal framework, there is a notable tradeoff between
the ability to model all behaviours of a program and the need for rigour.
Since separation logic (LHQ08; CDNQ08; CDOY09; CDNQ10; DOY06; NDQC07)
has proven an effective formalism for the analysis of memory-manipulating programs,
Middelkoop et al. (MHK04) proposed a separation logic based framework for class-based
languages, such as Java . In 2012, Gardner et al. (GMS12) produced a program logic
for reasoning about a broad subset of JavaScript using separation logic. Their big-step
operational semantics follows the work from Maffeis et al. (MMT08) in 2008.
2.4 Summary
This chapter first surveys the features of JavaScript. These features show the flex-
ibility of the language in terms of dynamic features, essentially including implicit type
conversion, object field modification on the fly, function object, prototype inheritance,
and scope chain. Then it reviews the client-side applications of JavaScript, particularly
in the aspect of third party applications. Then, safety issue and possible solutions are
discussed. However, there are several problems with the existing solutions. One of the
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common problems is that these solutions are only able to solve one particular issue. A
decent solution needs to ensure the ”quality” of a JavaScript application. Therefore,
a formal verification framework on JavaScript is in need. A discussion on a number
of existing frameworks in Table 2.3 shows that it is still an open research problem on
formally modelling the semantics of JavaScript, reasoning about behaviours of the pro-
grams, and providing a formal framework to verify the functional correctness and safety
of JavaScript programs. More detailed discussions are shown below:
• Since the safety issue is caused by maliciously manipulating this variable, most
solutions focus on eliminating the variables that are either unsafe or grant uncon-
trolled access to a host page or that contribute to poor code quality. However,
these solutions have proposed in the cost of sacrificing certain expressiveness of
the language.
• The existing JavaScript formal frameworks studies merely concentrate on mod-
elling a few features of JavaScript. Therefore, a comprehensive framework which
is not only able to model the essence of the language but also the ability of verifying
functional correctness of the programs is required.
• The research in separation logic shows the ability as a foundation of a formal frame-
work to model the essential and flexible features of JavaScript. Most studies in
separation logic based JavaScript formal framework, are focusing on verifying func-
tional correctness of JavaScript programs. Middelkoop et al. (MHK04) stated that
the main challenge lies in constructing operational and axiomatic semantics rules
for the function invocation feature. Therefore, a elegant framework for verifying
both functional correctness and safety of the programs is in needed.
• Another problem of many frameworks is that they ignored soundness proof. Huth
and Tryan (HR04) stated that a formal framework must prove soundness property.
Therefore, soundness proof of a proposed framework is in need.
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Accordingly, this thesis will propose a comprehensive and elegant formal framework,
which focuses on verifying functional correctness and safety properties of JavaScript
programs. The framework is built on the underlying semantics of separation logic.
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Frameworks and Solutions
ADSafe And05 Yu07 Jen09 Chu09 Sax10 Guh10 Dar12 Maf09 Rei07 Gua09 Dew10 Gar12 JS tsl
Features
Obj Creation
Obj Literal 4 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 ? 4
Obj ”new” Crt. 4 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 ? 4
Function
Function Declar. 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 4 ? 4
Function Expre. 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ? 4
Method Call 4 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 8 ? 4
Global Call 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Nested Func. 4 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Field
Field Crt. 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Field Lookup 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Field Mutation 4 4 8 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Variable
Global Assign. 8 4 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4
Local Assign. 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4
Expre. Return 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
With 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 ? 4
Eval 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 8 ? 4
”this” Keyword 8 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Array 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 ? 8
Iteration 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Conditional 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Prototype Inherit. 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4
Scope Chain 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4
Alias 8 4 8 8 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 ? 8
Total No. of Features 13 10 5 11 15 10 18 16 18 15 12 ? 20
(Total No. of Features/22) % 59% 45% 23% 50% 68% 45% 82% 73% 82% 68% 56% ? 90%
Problem
Functional Correctness 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4
Memory Leak 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8
Capability Leak 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8
Safety Breach 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8
(Total No. of Problems/4) % 0% 0% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0% 75% 50% 50% 50% 25% 25%
Table 2.3: Comparisons of Frameworks for JavaScript
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JSsl - A Subset of JavaScript
Inside every large program, there is a small program trying to get out. The
job of formal methods is to elucidate the assumptions upon which formal
correctness depends. – Tony Hoare (British computer scientist)
3.1 Introduction
Recent research shows that JavaScript can run improperly (Cro08; Crong; Fla11) in
some circumstance. It indicates that the existing verification approaches (Flo67; Hoa69;
Rey05) generally do not provide an elegant way to automatically verify JavaScript pro-
grams because of its dynamic features of subset of JavaScript (RLBV10). This chapter
constructs a framework to model the dynamic features. Compared with the approaches
discussed in Section 2.3.4, this framework defines an abstract core subset of JavaScript,
JSsl and proposes a sound separation logic based static axiomatic system to verify the
functional correctness of JSsl program. Firstly, the core language JSsl (See Figure 3.1)
is defined as the language used throughout the rest of this chapter. Secondly, a reliable
formal operational semantics is presented with a stack and heap model. Thirdly, a set
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of separation logic based axiomatic rules are constructed to support the functional cor-
rectness verification of JSsl programs.
Figure 3.1: JavaScript v.s. JSsl
3.2 The Language JSsl
In this section, the target language JSsl is defined. Being a prototype-based language,
inheritance of JSsl is performed via a process of cloning existing objects that serve as
prototypes. Its syntax is formally defined in Figure 3.2.
A program in the JSsl language consists of a sequence of Statement. Compared
with the full version JavaScript language, this language has omitted some features,
such as array, and for loop. The semantics of the language constructs follows the same
conventions as in JavaScript, except for the global variable and local variable declaration.
Other that that, the JSsl behaves like the essences of a JavaScript program which is in
Section 2.2.1, including the feature of prototype inheritance, function objects and object
amplifying on the fly.
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3.2.1 The Features and Conventions of JSsl
The aim is to not only provide a realistic subset of JavaScript but also that it is
manageable and feasible with respect to formalization and static verification. The main
features of JSsl are described as follows:
• Object fields1 can be created dynamically on the fly.
• Support for prototype chain inheritance.
• Functions are treated as objects, a Function Declaration construct is not allowed in
the language as they can be easily and often unintentionally turned into a Function
Expression. Another reason is that it would cause significant and irreconcilable
semantic difference (See Section 2.2.1.3).
• Support for parameter manipulation by value and reference. For the primitive data
type parameters, the copy−in algorithm is used to get a copy of the value inside the
parameter and the update of the underlying parameter will not affect its original
value. The reference type parameters perform according to the copy−in−copy−out
algorithm in which the update of the underlying variable also overwrite the original
value. For example:
1In JavaScript, concept “property” is used instead of “field”. We use field in conforming to the
common terminology in OO area.
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myNum = 10;
myObj = {name : ”David”, age : 12};
func changeV als(num, obj){
var num = 0;
var obj.name = ”changed”;
}
changeV als(myNum,myObj);
alert(myNum); // This returns integer 10
alert(myObj.name); // This returns changed
• Support distinction between global variables and local variables. A variable can be
either declared explicitly or implicitly. The var keyword explicitly declares that
the variable is a new identifier in the local scope that is the current function scope.
Implicitly define a variable by simply referring to it without using the var keyword
declares a global variable. Essentially, the explicit variable definition declares local
variables, and the implicit definition declares global variables.
The other code conventions for JSsl are based on JavaScript conventions. The object
OProto is the global object Prototype.Object in JavaScript, it can be dereferenced to
@proto that is an internal property in an execution context. FProto is the object for
the root of @proto when the underlying object is a function type. @scope refers to a
scope chain. The this variable is not supported as a statement in JSsl but as an internal
property of a function object whose value can be dereferenced to this. The statements
eval, and with are not in the language JSsl . In a literal object, more than one definition
of the same data property is forbidden. Duplication of named parameters of a function
is also not supported.
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3.2.2 The Syntax of JSsl
In Figure 3.2, there are expression Exp for variable, primitive type value, arithmetic
or boolean operation, and function call. The ExpFunc can be either an expression or a
function expression. More details are given below:
• The arithmetic or boolean operation are p(e1, ..., en), for example:
add(x, y); // add variable x and y
times(x, y); // multiply variable x and y
ge(x, y); // compare variable x and y
• F ([x1, ..., xn]) is defined as a returned function call in a function with optional
parameters x1, ..., xn.
• func [F ]([x1, ..., xn]) {c} is a function expression abstraction with optional name
F , optional parameters x1, ..., xn, and function body c.
• skip is for skip statement in the program execution process.
• x=ee is a global assignment that assigns ee to variable x. The variable x lives in
the global scope.
• var x = ee is a local variable assignment. All the local variables declared and
assigned inside of a functions scope must be after the var keyword, and they are
only visible in their defined function scopes. For example:
f = func(){ var x = 10; return x; };
alert(f()); // This returns integer 10
alert(x); // This returns undefined
The reason that the alert(x) statement returns undefined is because x only lives
in the scope of function f , and invisible from the global scope.
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• x = x′.f is a field lookup statement, the name of the field may either be declared
initially or specified on the fly. For example:
obj = {f1 : 10, f2 : 20};
obj.f3 = func(){return 30}; // This generates field f3 to obj on the fly
x = obj.f3(); //This returns integer 30
The field lookup follows the prototype chain which searches the current object
for the field, if the field cannot be found in the scope of the current object, it
searches along the prototype chain (See Section 2.2.1) until it reaches the global
object OProto. In the case that the field cannot be retrieved from OProto, then
an undefined value undef is returned.
• For the field mutation construct, x.f=ee, the value of field f is updated to ee when
the field f is initially owned in the object record that is referred to by x or it is
inherited from its prototype. In the case where the field f does not exist in the
object record referred by x, a new value ee is added into the record dynamically.
JSsl supports arbitrary field modification of an object record on the fly.
• return e returns the value of the expression e.
• x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]) and x = x0([e1, ..., en]) are two forms of function call that
have a subtle difference: calling a function through an object and directly calling a
function. Calling through an object x = x′.x0([e1, .., en]) implies that this1 in the
function refers to the receiver object x′; whereas when calling directly a function
x = x0([e1, .., en]), this refers to the global object OProto. The internal variable
1The special variable this denotes the current object in scope. For example, when executing a
function from a source object, this in the function refers to that enclosing object x′, but when a function
is executed independently, then variable this refers to the global object.
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this is one of the execution context components, which is used to evaluate to the
value of ThisBinding of the current execution context1.
• The object literal statement x = {f1:ee1, .., fn:een} creates a new object x that
has a series of literal fields f1, .., fn with a series of value ee1, .., een.
• The object creation statement x = new x′() creates a new object x with its proto-
type field sets that are inherited from its prototype object x′. The newly created
object x has an internal property @proto pointing to the OProto.
• The object creation function object x = new x′([e1, .., en]) creates a new object x
by invoking a function x′([e1, .., en]). It creates a new object x through function
object x′ invocation. Note that the parameter list e1, ..., en is optional for the
function. Compared with object creation statement, it has newly created object
as a type of function with internal property @proto pointing to FProto instead of
OProto.
• Statements sequence is c ; c. The program is a sequence of statements c separated
by semicolons.
• Conditional statement is if (e) {c} else {c}. If e is true then execute statement
before the else, otherwise execute the statement after the else.
• Iteration is while (e) {c}. While e is true then execute statement c.
3.3 Example
This section describes how a piece of JavaScript code transforms into JSsl code using
examples. Figure 3.3 is a piece of JavaScript program. It defines an object obj that has
1An execution context is purely a specification mechanism which is not necessary to correspond to
any particular JavaScript interpreters.
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e ∈ Exp ::= x Variable
| v Primitive Value
| p(e1, ..., en) Arithmetic or Boolean
| F ([x1, ..., xn]) Function
ee ∈ ExpFunc ::= e Exp
| func [F ]([x1, ..., xn]) {c} [named] FuncExp
c ∈ Statement ::= skip Skip
| x = ee GlobalAssignment
| var x = ee LocalAssignment
| x = x′.f FieldLookup
| x.f = ee FieldMutation
| return e Return
| x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]) FuncCall
| x = x0([e1, ..., en]) FuncCall
| x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn : een} ObjLiteral
| x = new x′() ObjCreation
| x = new x′([e1, .., en]) ObjCrtFunc
| c; c Sequencing
| if (e) {c} else {c} Condtional
| while (e) {c} Iteration
Identifiers
F ∈ FuncID ::= F | F ′ | ...
f ∈ FieldID ::= f | f ′ | f1 | x | ...
b ∈ BooleanID ::= True | False
x ∈ V ariableID ::= x | x′ | x0 | ...
v ∈ V ariable ::= int | str | null | undef
[...] ::= optional
Figure 3.2: Syntax of JSsl
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two fields, one of them (f2) is a function object. There is a conditional construct inside
of function object f3 that is nested in the function object f2. The JavaScript example
of Figure 3.3 demonstrates the following features:
• Creation of object using object literal (line2 to 11),
• Creation of function object (line 5 to 8),
• Conditional Statement (line 6 and 7)
• Output of object (line 12, 13, 15 and 17),
• Field f3 mutation on the fly (line 14),
• Object creation via function f2.
Figure 3.4 presents the JSsl program that is transformed from the JavaScript code in
Figure 3.3 and conforms to the syntax of JSsl . This transformation does not change the
program semantics. Again, such a transformation aids to formalize and verify JavaScript
in a realistic subset language. Note that the alert has no effect in the program, as it
only produces an output.
3.4 Semantics for JSsl
The structural operational semantics for JSsl is a big-step semantics which shows
transitions between machine configurations. Each machine configuration is a triple con-
sisting of current program statement c, stack s and heap h. Before we approach to
construct the operational semantics of JSsl , we firstly define the semantic domains.
3.4.1 Semantic Domain
In the semantic domain, variables include the type of primitive variables and loca-
tions. A value is either a primitive value or a location. Primitive variables are type of
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1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var obj = {
3 f1 : 1 ,
4 f 2 : function (n) {
5 var fn3 = function ( ) {
6 i f (n >= 10) { re turn 2 ;}
7 else { re turn 3 ;}
8 }
9 re turn fn3 ( ) ;
10 }
11 } ;
12 a l e r t ( obj . f 2 ( 1 1 ) ) ; //2
13 a l e r t ( obj . f 3 ) ; // undef ined
14 obj . f 3 = 5 ;
15 a l e r t ( obj . f 3 ) ; //5
16 r e s = obj . f 2 ( 1 ) ; //3
17 a l e r t ( r e s ) ;
18 </s c r i p t>
Figure 3.3: JavaScript Example
1 obj = {
2 f1 : 1 ,
3 f 2 : func (n) {
4 var fn3 = func ( ) {
5 i f ( ge (n , 1 0 ) ) { re turn 2 }
6 e l s e { re turn 3}
7 }
8 var x = fn3 ( ) ;
9 re turn x
10 }
11 } ;
12 obj . f 3 = 5 ;
13 r e s = obj . f 2 (1 )
Figure 3.4: JSsl Example
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integer number, boolean value, string, and the set consisting of undefined and null. Loca-
tions correspond to object identifiers that can be partially viewed as memory addresses.
Note that, a location ` can be a nullable memory address in some context. Objects are
either a literally declared object which is a finite mapping from field identifiers to values
or function expressions.
Value = Prim ∪ Loc
Prim = Int unionmultiBool unionmulti Str unionmulti {undef ,null}
The operation semantics for the JSsl language provides the meanings of the language
program constructs that transforms from initial state to final state in a mathematically
rigorous way. The program state δ is a pair consisting of stack s and heap h:
s, h ∈ State = Stack×Heap
• Stack s. Stacks are modelled as finite and stackable 1 mappings from variables to
values. Stack denotes a partial function from variables (object identifications) to
values or locations with a finite domain:
s ∈ Stack = Var→sfin Value ∪ Loc
The semantics for the evaluation of an expression e in the stack is defined as s(e)
where the expression e is associated with the current activated stack environment.
It is defined as below:
s(e) = Stack→ Prim ∪ Loc ∪ {error}
1Stackable mapping means a variable x might occur more than once, for example f: A →sfin B
denotes finite stackable mapping A to B, but it only updates the most recently included mapping of A
by B.
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Note that the evaluation of an expression in the stack may lead to a normal value
(Prim) or a location (Loc) or an error (error). The error occurs while the
statement or expression is being executed.
• Heap h. Heaps are modelled as finite partial mapping from locations to records.
As shown below:
h ∈ Heap = Loc ⇀fin Record
Where a record is a reification 1 of an object in the heap. Records are the union
of a finite mapping from fields to values and functions. Note that the functions in
the records include parameters and function body. As shown below:
r ∈ Record = (Var→fin Value) ∪ Func
Note that a direct written-form for records as [n1 : v1, . . .] is adopted, which
describes that the record has the field n1 with the value v1, etc.
Furthermore, one of the implicit fields in a record for objects is @proto whose value
is a reference to the record representing the prototype of this object. In other words,
@proto could lead to the prototype of the underlying request object. In the prototype
chain, the location of the root object OProto is defined as locop.
In addition, ”functions as objects” are adopted in JSsl , a function Func can be
stored in objects as a field. It contains three sub-fields: body, params, and @proto, as
shown below:
Func = {[body : c,params : (x1, .., xn),@proto : locop]
| c ∈ ProcBody ∧ n ∈ N}
1The reification of an object refers to the explicit data model or other object created in the current
object context. In my thesis, record reification involves finding a more concrete representation of the
abstract object data type used in a formal specification, such as the primitive variables, functions and
other objects.
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where (x1, .., xn) are parameters of the function, and c is the function body belonging to
the set ProcBody. Here the value of @proto is taken as locop for every function object
for brevity1. We use N to denote the set of natural numbers.
The semantics for the evaluation of an expression e in the heap is defined as h(`)(e)
where ` is a location that is in the range of the stack and e is associated expression in
the heap. It is defined as below:
h(`)(e) =
 Heap→ RecordHeap→ (Prim ∪ Loc) ∪ {error}
It is possible that there is more than one Stack and Heap memory cell in the Heap
pool. Thus, an expression e in the heap pool can either be evaluated to be a record that
is pointing to another heap cell or a union of a primitive value, location and error when
the e is a local variable.
3.4.2 Operational Semantics
This section develops the operational semantics of the JSsl language, which defines
the behaviour of the program in terms of a set of transition relations and inference rules.
The specification A1 A2 ... AnB means that if the expression A1, A2, ..., and An are true,
then the program configuration B will update with the transitions. The configuration B
is defined in the form of:
c, (s, h)→ (s′, h′) or
c, (s, h)→ ⊥
where c is the underlying program construct in the current context, (s, h) defines a
program state δ, the transition starts from the initial state (s, h) and terminate at state
(s′, h′) after finishing the execution of c. The ⊥ represents abortion when the execution
1In JavaScript, the @proto field of every function objects refers to Function.Prototype. This simplifi-
cation does not alter the semantics.
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fails. The symbols δ and ⊥ are used to represent a program state in the concrete semantic
model.
The full set of transition rules for all program statements, including rules for variable
assignment (see Figure 3.5), rules for operations on fields(see Figure 3.6), rules for function
invocation (see Figure 3.7), rules for object creation (see Figure 3.8), and rules for control
structures (see Figure 3.9).
In the case where the evaluation of a statement reaches error, the final program state
would end at abortion (⊥). In the final state, any expression inside of the operation [ ]
is an updated part to the initial state after an execution of a statement c. Furthermore,
the operation s[x 7→ v] ”pushes” the variable x onto s with the value v. The operation
s′ = s\χ removes a set of variables χ from the domain of s. That is dom(s\χ) = dom(s)\χ
and (s\χ)(x) = s′(x), for any x ∈ dom(s)\χ. For example, s′ = s\{x0} removes the
variable x0 from the domain of s, and (s\x0)(x) = s′(x) means that it evaluates the
variable x from the domain of s′, where x ∈ dom(s)\x0. Similarly, the operation h[` 7→ r]
extends the heap with a cell ` 7→ r. Note that, the expression h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] evaluates
the variable x in the record r in the heap h, and returns the value v.
In addition, there are various cases that may lead the execution of a statement to
fail such as when the evaluation of an expression gives an error or the variable to be
assigned to does not exist. The expression or else is used to combine several different
failure cases. For example, A or else B defines that A∨(¬A∧B).The or else expression
is left associative:
A or else B or else C = (A or else B) or else C .
Figure 3.5 defines the inference rules for global variable assignment and local variable
assignment. The full set of rules are described as follows:
• In [op-skip], both the stack and heap are unmodified.
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skip, (s, h) → (s, h) [op-skip]
s(e) = v
x = e, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ v], h)
[op-glob-assign1]
s(e) = error
x = e, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-glob-assign1-abt]
` ∈ dom(h) h(`)(e) = v
var x = e, (s, h) → (s, h[ 7`→r[x 7→ v]])
[op-local-assign1]
` /∈ dom(h) or else ` = null or else h(`)(e) = error
var x = e, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-local-assign1-abt]
s(x) = ` ` 6= null h(`) = r
r = [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto : locop]
x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h) → (s[x 7→`], h[`7→r])
[op-glob-assign2]
s(x) = error or else ` = null
x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-glob-assign2-abt]
`0 ∈ dom(h) ` 6= null h(`0)(x) = `
h(`) = [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto : locop]
var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h) → (s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→ `]])
[op-local-assign2]
` is not in h or else ` = null or else h(`)(x) = error
var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-local-assign2-abt]
Figure 3.5: Operational Semantics for Variable Assignments
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x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) f ∈ dom(h(s(x′))) h(s(x′))(f) = v
x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ v], h)
[op-lookup-field]
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) f /∈ dom(h(s(x′)))
h(s(x′))(@proto) = s(x′′) x = x′′.f, (s, h) → (s′, h′)
x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s′, h′)
[op-lookup-proto]
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) h(s(x′)) = OProto
f /∈ dom(OProto)
x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ undef], h)
[op-lookup-undef]
x′ /∈ dom(s) or else s(x′) /∈ dom(h)
x = x′.f, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-lookup-field-abt]
x ∈ dom(s) s(x) = ` ` ∈ dom(h) h(`) = r s(ee) = v
x.f = ee, (s, h) → (s, h[` 7→ r[f 7→ v]])
[op-mutate-field]
s(ee) = error or else x /∈ dom(s)
or else s(x) /∈ dom(h) or else h(s(x)) = error
x.f = ee, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-mutate-field-abt]
` ∈ dom(h) ` 6= null h(`)(e) = v
return e, (s, h) → (s, h[` 7→ v])
[op-return]
` /∈ dom(h) or else ` = null or else h(`)(e) = error
return e, (s, h) → ⊥
[op-return-abt]
Figure 3.6: Operational Semantics for Field Statements
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• In [op-glob-assign1], v is the evaluation of expression e, the heap is unmodified.
• In [op-local-assign1], the variable x is declared in the local scope of a function body
and has location ` in the heap. If ` is an existing nullable location, the local
variable x is declared in ` with value v. The evaluation of the local assignment
causes the stack to be unmodified and the heap is extended by x 7→ v.
• In [op-glob-assign2], if ` is a nullable the location of variable x in the stack with a
value of record r. A new record r is created in the heap. The heap cell stores the
details of the function F . Thus, in the stack s, ` is bound to x. In the heap, r
is allocated with a set of function body c, params x1, ..., xn and @proto with its
location locop. Note that, locop is the location of OProto. This rule implies two
cases: in the case of l ∈ dom(h), it overwrites the location `, whereas in the case
of ` /∈ dom(h), it generates a new location `.
• In [op-local-assign2], it is similar with the [op-glo-assign2] except that the statement
is declared in an existing location `0 in the heap. If the function object x had
location `, thus the stack is unmodified, but the heap is extended by the cell of
x 7→ `.
In Figure 3.6, the rules for the object field operations are defined. The language
JSsl allows that all the program transitions on field operation are located in global
scope rather than local scope except for the return statement. The full set of rules are
described as follows:
• In [op-lookup-field], x′ is in the domain of stack s and has value v in the heap. The
value v of the request field f is bound to the variable x in the stack, the heap is
unmodified.
• In [op-lookup-proto], in the case where the field f does not belong to the domain of
the heap h, then it follows the prototype chain with @proto to retrieve its prototype
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object x′′ to evaluate f by [op-lookup-field] recursively.
• In [op-lookup-undef], the undefined value is bound to x when the field f does not
belong to the fields of the root object OProto that can be followed by the prototype
chain. The heap is unmodified.
• In [op-mutate-field], the existing field f of object x is updated, the stack is unmodi-
fied. In the heap, the record r that contains f mapping to the value of ee is bound
to value of x. This rule can be applied to two cases. In the case where f does not
exist in the object x, f is generated as a new field of x, and its value is set to be
the evaluation of ee. In the case where the field f does exist in the object x, hence
f will be automatically rewrote to have value v.
• In [op-return], v is the evaluation of expression e, the heap is unmodified.
In Figure 3.7, the rules for function expression and function invocation are defined.
The language JSsl allows these constructs to be only visible in global scope. In the
following, the semantic rules for function expression and function invocation are specified.
• In [op-fun-call-obj], the object x has the requested function x0. Invoking the func-
tion x0 causes the execution of function body c that includes the evaluation of
parameters e1, ..., en, and the variable this points to the object x
′. After the ex-
ecution of c, in the stack, s carries the original stack s and pushes the variable x
to s with the evaluation of the variable result 1. In the heap, h1 is the heap that
h′ removes the variable this and parameters. As the local function parameters
and the variable this should be not accessible from the outside of the function but
also should be carried in the heap cell, therefore we have the heap h2 to store the
completed data after the invocation of function x0.
1”result” is the function return expression. To evaluate such expression can solve the function return
value.
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x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) h(s(x′)) = r
x0 ∈ dom(r) r(x0) = r′ r′ ∈ Func
r′(body) = c r′(params) = (x1, .., xn)
c, (s, h[this7→h(s(x′)), x1 7→h(e1), .., xn 7→h(en)]) → (s′, h′)
s1 = s[x 7→ s′(result)] h1 = h′\{this, x1, .., xn} h2 = h h1
x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s1, h2)
[op-fun-call-obj]
x′ /∈ dom(s) or else s(x′) /∈ dom(h) or else
h(s(x′)) = r x0 /∈ dom(r) or else r(x0) = r′ r′ /∈ Func
or else r′(body) = c r′(params) = (x1, .., xn)
c, (s, h[this7→h(s(x′)), x1 7→h(e1), .., xn 7→h(en)]) → ⊥
x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → ⊥
[op-fun-call-obj-abt]
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) h(s(x′)) = r x0 /∈ dom(r)
r(@proto) = s(x′′) x = x′′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s′, h′)
x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s′, h′)
[op-fun-call-proto]
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) h(s(x′)) = OProto
x0 /∈ dom(OProto)
x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s[x 7→ undef], h)
[op-fun-undef]
x0 ∈ dom(s) s(x0) ∈ dom(h) h(s(x0)) = r
r ∈ Func r(body) = c r(params) = (x1, .., xn)
c, (s, h[this7→locgo, x1 7→h(e1), .., xn 7→h(en)]) → (s′, h′)
s1 = s′[x 7→ s′(result)] h1 = h′\{this, x1, .., xn} h2 = h h1
x = x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s1, h2)
[op-fun-call-dir]
x0 /∈ dom(s) or else s(x0) /∈ dom(h)
or else h(s(x0)) = r r /∈ Func
or else r(body) = c r(params) = (x1, .., xn)
c, (s, h[this7→locgo, x1 7→h(e1), .., xn 7→h(en)]) → ⊥
x = x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → ⊥
[op-fun-call-dir-abt]
Figure 3.7: Operational Semantics for Function Invocation
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• In [op-fun-call-proto], the object x′ does not have such a function x0. The prototype
chain leads it to its prototype object x′′ which actually does have x0, then x0 is
evaluated by [op-fun-call-obj] recursively.
• In [op-fun-undef], all the objects (including OProto) in the prototype chain do not
have function x0 as their field. In the stack, s is directly extended to contain that
x maps to undef . The heap is unmodified.
• In [op-fun-call-dir], it is similar with [op-fun-call-obj] but the variable this is bound
to global object Globj who has location locgo, because the function invocation is
occurred in the global scope.
The Figure 3.8 describes the varies of object creations semantic rules. Note that
we exclude the scenario of creating object by function constructor, because the way of
defining a function constructor is complied with function expression, and JSsl supports
function expression:
• In [op-obj-literal], we meet a statement which asks to create the object x by giving
an object literal. In the stack, we extend it to contain the location ` of x. In the
heap, we build a record which denotes initial values for each field, including the
fields with corresponding values and @proto internal pointer points to OProto.
• In [op-obj-crt], the object x is generated by its prototype x′ by keyword new . The
location ` is not initially in the domain of the heap h but created on the fly. In the
stack, we extend it to contain `. In the heap, we extend it to include the variable
@proto pointing to `′ that is the location of the variable x′.
• In [op-obj-crt-func], the object x can be created by using function x′([e1, ..., en]) with
keyword new. The location of the resulting object x is ` which is initially not part
of the domain of heap h. The heap cell sp contains the mapping from the variable
this to ` and the mapping from formal parameters to actual parameters. After
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s(ee1) = v1, ..., s(een) = vn ` 6= null
r = [f1 : v1, ..., fn : vn,@proto : locop]
x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn : een}, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r])
[op-obj-literal]
s(eei) = error for some i
x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn : een}, (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-obj-literal-abt]
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) s(x′) = `′ ` 6= null `′ 6= null
x = new x′(), (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′]])
[op-obj-crt]
x′ /∈ dom(s) or else s(x′) /∈ dom(h) or else ` = null or else `′ = null
x = new x′(), (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-obj-crt-abt]
x′∈dom(s) s(x′)∈dom(h) ` 6= null ` is new in h
h(s(x′)) ∈ Func h(s(x′)) = r′
r′ = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
hp = [this7→`, x1 7→h(e1), .., xn 7→h(en)]
c, (s, hp h[s(x) 7→[@proto : s(x′)])→ (s′, h′)
s1 = s
′[x 7→ `] h2 = h′\{this, x1, .., xn} h2 = h h1
x = new x′([e1, .., en]), (s, h)→ (s1, h2)
[op-obj-crt-func]
x′ /∈ dom(s) or else s(x′) /∈ dom(h) or else ` = null
x = new x′([e1, .., en]), (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-obj-crt-func-abt]
Figure 3.8: Operational Semantics for Object Creation
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the execution of the function body c, the resulting stack is s′ and the resulting
heap is h′. Similarly with [op-fun-call-dir], in the final state, the stack pushes the
variable x to s′ with the value of evaluation of the variable result. The heap h1
removes the variable this and the parameters from h′ to ensure that they are not
accessible from the outside of function after the function returns. To reveal the
data completion, the final heap h2 is extended to include both h and h1.
Due to the operational semantics of sequential, conditional, and iteration structures
are standard and straightforward, as given in Figure 3.9, we omit the description for
brevity.
3.5 An Axiomatic Framework for JSsl
In this section, the specification language (also called assertion language) Specsl is
defined together with a set of symbolic execution rules. The specification language is
developed based on separation logic, where the abstract program state is annotated by
predicates, each of which describes either heap-insensitive statements or heap-sensitive
statements. It is designed for reasoning about the programs that manipulate mutable
data structures. The inference rules for JSsl is also built up in the style of separation
logic in terms of separation conjunction. The rationale for adopting separation logic is
because it is designed for local reasoning about programs that manipulate heap-allocated
data structures. The advantage of this includes that it can contribute to modelling of JSsl
programs that use the heap from an abstract point of views. The specification language
explicitly captures the ownership of objects, which provides sufficient information to
perform functional correctness property verification. In addition, it also manipulates
the field modification on the fly which is another core feature of JSsl .
68
3.5 An Axiomatic Framework for JSsl
c1, (s, h)→ (s′, h′) c2, (s′, h′)→ (s′′, h′′)
c1; c2, (s, h)→ (s′′, h′′)
[op-sequential]
c1, (s, h)→ ⊥
c1; c2, (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-sequential-abt]
s(b) = true c1, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
if(b) {c1} else {c2}, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
[op-conditional-true]
s(b) = false c2, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
if(b) {c1} else {c2}, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
[op-conditional-false]
s(b) = error
if(b) {c1} else {c2}, (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-conditional-abt]
s(b) = false
while (b) {c}, (s, h)→ (s, h)
[op-iteration-false]
s(b) = true c; while (b) {c}, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
while (b) {c}, (s, h)→ (s′, h′)
[op-iteration-true]
s(b) = error
while (b) {c}, (s, h)→ ⊥
[op-iteration-abt]
Figure 3.9: Operational Semantics for Control Structures
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3.5.1 Specification Language for JSsl
To capture the desired level of program correctness for JSsl programs, logical opera-
tions are taken from separation logic to specify heap-allocated objects that can be used.
The specification language uses the pre-condition and post-condition that are illustrated
by logic formulas to describe ”states” consisting of a stack and a heap. The meaning
of the pair of pre-condition and post-condition is that if the execution of the program
statement in the context of a program state satisfies its pre-condition, and if it termi-
nates, then it terminates in another state that satisfies the corresponding post-condition.
Otherwise, if the program state does not satisfy the post-condition, the verification fails
and an error is reported.
According to the concrete heap model (see Section 3.4.1), a fixed finite collection
fields (variables), and a disjoint set of locations, variables of non-addressable values are
defined as below:
Heap = Loc ⇀fin (Var→fin Value ∪ Func)
Stack = Var→sfin Value ∪ Loc
The framework adopts the partial correctness semantics of Hoare logic with tight
interpretation. Tight interpretation is another crucial aspect of separation logic, which
defines that well-specified programs do not go wrong. According to such interpretation,
our language for reasoning about the heap model applies a certain pure (heap insensitive)
and spatial (heap sensitive) assertions to describe the symbolic heap (abstract state). A
symbolic heap ∆ is a pair Π ‖ Σ where Π is essentially a conjunction separated sequence
of pure formula, and Σ is a ∗ separated sequence of partial formula. Therefore, we have
a valid specification { ∆1 } c { ∆2 } ensure that command c should not encounter any
memory faults when it starts in a program state satisfying ∆1. The tight interpretation
also requires the pre-condition ∆1 of a statement to guarantee that all memory locations
can be accessed by the execution of the statement, except for the freshly allocated ones
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that are allocated in advanced. A memory location x is allocated with points-to relation,
such as x 7→ represents location x points-to somewhere in a heap cell.
In Figure 3.10, we show that a specification is a triple who is composed of an ab-
stract pre-condition assertion ∆1, command c and an abstract post-condition assertion
∆2. For each symbolic heap ∆, the pure formulas include boolean values, a sequence
of ∧ and ∨ separated formulas, existential quantification variable, and expression as-
signment. The symbol ”∼” represents the relationship of {=, >,<,≤,≥}. In the heap
sensitive formulas, it essentially contains emp that denotes an empty heap, and the
formula x7→[f1 : e1, .., fn : en] denotes a heap-allocated object referred to by reference x,
which contains fields f1, .., fn whose values are e1, .., en where e and ei (i ∈ Z) represent
expressions, and fi (i ∈ Z) denotes field names. The formula Σ1 ∗Σ2 (resp. Σ1−∗Σ2) de-
notes the separation conjunction (resp. separation implication) of two heap formula Σ1
and Σ2 that are two disjoined heap cells. For separation implication, Σ2 is the updated
heap cell with respect to Σ1.
The semantics is given by a forcing relation s, h |= M where s ∈ Stack, h ∈ Heap,
and M can be a symbolic heap, a pure assertion, a heap assertion. This satisfiability is
used to prove the soundness of a axiomatic framework in Section 3.5.3.
Furthermore, the full semantics is shown in Figure 3.11. For the pure Π, as noted in
the last line of the figure, their semantics are defined with a specific notation A, which
is preserved by the entailment prover that we use for soundness proving. Its definition
is given in Figure 3.12
In our semantics, we allow a singleton heap formula x 7→[f1 : e1, .., fn : en] to spec-
ify partial fields of object x. The definition of heap disjointness is to allow partial
objects being specified separately, we relax the usual disjointness definition as follows:
h1#h2 iff dom(h1)∩dom(h2) = ∅ or ∀ ` ∈ dom(h1)∩dom(h2)·dom(h1(`))∩dom(h2(`)) = ∅.
This allows us to represent a partial view of a heap-allocated object in our specifications.
This flexibility does not cause any practical problems as our framework always main-
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Specification Specsl ::= { ∆1 } c { ∆2 }
Abstract state ∆ ::= Π ‖ Σ
Pure formula Π ::= b | Π1∧Π2 | Π1∨Π2 | ∃x.Π | x∼e
Heap formula Σ ::= emp | x7→r | Σ1 ∗ Σ2 | Σ1 −∗Σ2 | ∃x.Σ
Boolean b ::= true | false | x | b1 = b2
Variable x ::= f | x′ | xi(i ∈ Z)
Fields f ::= f ′ | fi(i ∈ Z)
Expression e ::= F | v | x | const | ei(i ∈ Z)
Record r ::= [f1 : e1, .., fn : en] | e
Figure 3.10: The Specification Language Specsl
tains a more complete view of an object via normalisation: x 7→ [f1:e1..fn:en] ∗ x 7→
[fn+1:en+1..fn+m:en+m] x 7→ [f1:e1..fn+m:en+m].
3.5.2 Inference Rules
This section defines inference rules for reasoning about JSsl statements. Our inference
rules abstractly capture the symbolic execution of these statements. The full list of rules
can be found in Figure 3.13, Figure 3.14, Figure 3.15, and Figure 3.16.
The frame rule is derived from separation logic, which is shown as follows:
{P} c {Q} modified(c) ∩ vars(R) = ∅
{P ∗ R} c {Q ∗ R}
[sl-frame]
where modified(c) denotes the program variables modified by c, and vars(R) represents
the set of free variables in the assertion R. Essentially, this [sl-frame] rule allows us to
focus only in the parts of the heap that are actually manipulated by the execution of
the command when we prove a specification (so called the memory footprint).
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s, h |= Π ‖ Σ iff s |= Π and (s, h) |= Σ
s, h |= emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |= x 7→[f1:e1..fn:en] iff dom(h) = {s(x)} and
h(s(x)) = [f1 : s(e1), .., fn : s(en)]
s, h |= x 7→F iff dom(h) = {s(x)} and
h(s(x)) = [body : c,params : (...),@proto : locfp]
s, h |= x 7→const iff dom(h) = {s(x)} and
h(s(x)) = const, where const is OProto
s, h |= Σ1 ∗ Σ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1#h2 and
h = h1 ∗ h2 and s, h1 |= Σ1 and s, h2 |= Σ2
s, h |= Σ1 −∗Σ2 iff ∀h1 · (dom(h1)∩dom(h)=∅ and s, h1 |= Σ1)
implies s, h ∗ h1 |= Σ2
s, h |= ∃x · Σ iff ∃r, h1, h2 · h1#h2 and h = h1 ∗ h2,
h1 = [x 7→ r] and s, h |= Σ
s, h |= Σ iff h |= Σ
s |= Π iff s |=A Π
Figure 3.11: The Semantic Model for Specsl
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s |=A true iff always
s |=A false iff never
s |=A b1 = b2 iff s(b1) = s(b2)
s |=A x iff s(x) = true
s |=A x = e iff s(x) = s(e)
s |=A x > e iff s(x) > s(e)
s |=A x < e iff s(x) < s(e)
s |=A x ≤ e iff s(x) ≤ s(e)
s |=A x ≥ e iff s(x) ≥ s(e)
s |=A Π1∧Π2 iff s |=A Π1 and s |=A Π2
s |=A Π1∨Π2 iff s |=A Π1 or s |=A Π2
s |=A ∃x.Π iff s |=A Π[v/x] for some v
Figure 3.12: The Semantic Model for Pure Formula in Specsl
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We defined a helper function LV(Σ) to describe the relationship between a variable
and the heap formula:
LV(emp) ::= ∅
LV(x7→r) ::= {x}
LV(Σ1 ∗ Σ2) ::= LV(Σ1) ∪ LV(Σ2)
Besides, the operation (∃x · Π1) ∧ Π2 states that there is a variable x in the pure
formula Π1. Similarly, the operation (∃x·1)∗Σ2 states that there is a variable in the heap
formula Σ1. In our rules, the expression @proto is an internal property for each object
that is pointing to the prototype object of the current one. It may return the location
locfp (it has const value FProto) or locop (it has const value OProto). By following a
prototype chain, OProto is the root object at the end of the chain. The value FProto is
the root object at the end of chain when the object is a type of function.
The inference rules for the statement of variable assignment and field manipulation
are given in Figure 3.13. The explanations for the full set rules are shown as follow:
• In [sl-skip], the pre-condition and post-condition are the same.
• In [sl-glob-assign1], every variable declaration and assignment in the global scope is
located in the pure formula. Its occurrences in the pre-condition are replaced by
expression e in the post-condition.
• In [sl-local-assign1], local variables are all declared in the local scope and located
in the heap formula. Their occurrences in the pre-condition are replaced by the
expression e in the post-condition.
• In [sl-glob-assign2], x 7→ r is a heap cell that is generated by creating function F
expression.
• In [sl-local-assign2], the function expression x is declared inside of a existing function
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{Π ‖ Σ}skip{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-skip]
{Π[e/x] ‖ Σ}x = e{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-glob-assign1]
{Π ‖ Σ[e/x]}var x = e{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-local-assign1]
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
{Π ‖ emp}x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r}
[sl-glob-assign2]
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x0 7→ r0 x0 ∈ Func
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop] x /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r)}
[sl-local-assign2]
r = [..., f : v, ...]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r}x = x′.f{(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}
[sl-lookup-field]
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) f /∈ dom(r)
r(@proto) = x′′ {Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.f{Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ}x = x′.f{Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′}
[sl-lookup-proto]
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
f /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.f{∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ}
[sl-lookup-undef]
r = [..., f : v, ...] or else f /∈ dom(r)
{Π ‖ x 7→r}x.f = ee{Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee]}
[sl-mutate-field]
Figure 3.13: Inference Rules for Variable Assignments and Field Statements
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scope (the scope of x0) located in the heap cell x0 7→ r0. a disjoint heap cell x 7→ r
is generated by the creation of function expression x.
• In [sl-lookup-field], the pre-condition contains the existing object x′ maps to record
r, in the record r, we have the underlying object x with the corresponding value
v. The pure formula is updated by x = v in the post-condition.
• In [sl-lookup-proto], if the requested field f is not in the record of object x′, but
in another heap cell Σ, hence the @proto leads to its prototype object x′′ and
recursively applies [sl-lookup-field] rule. In the post-condition, the heap cell Σ is
updated to Σ′.
• In [sl-lookup-undef], if the requested field f cannot be found in the record of object
OProto, the post-condition only extends with x = undef.
• In [sl-mutate-field], when the requested field f is in the record of object x or not in
that record, under both circumstances the heap formula in the post-condition is
updated by the heap cell of the variable x 7→ r.
The inference rules refer to functions invocation are given in Figure 3.14:
• In [sl-fun-call-obj], when we call a function object x0 from the object x′, and x0
can be fetched in the record of x′, then the pure formula in the post-condition is
updated by the variable x with value res that is the return value of calling the
function x0. Other certain updates in the heap formula from Σ to Σ1.
• In [sl-fun-call-proto], if the requested function object x0 is not reachable in the record
of x′, it follows @proto to its prototype object x′′ and reach x0 in somewhere by
[sl-fun-call-obj]. The post-condition updates in the both pure formula and heap
formula.
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Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..] ∗ x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...]
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this : x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2}
[sl-fun-call-obj]
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) x0 /∈ dom(r) r(@proto) = x′′
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
[sl-fun-call-proto]
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
x0 /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ}
[sl-fun-undef]
Σ ≡ (Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1...xn),@proto:locfp, ...])
Σ1 ≡ (Σ ∗ x′ 7→ [this : locw, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2}
[sl-fun-call-dir]
Figure 3.14: Inference Rules for Function Invocation
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• In [sl-fun-undef], if the requested function object x0 is not able to be fetched in
record of OProto, thus in the post-condition, only the pure formula is extended by
x = undef.
• In [sl-fun-call-dir], in the case of directly invoking function x0, the post-condition
updates by function return value res in the pure formula and from Σ to Σ2 in the
heap formula.
A set of inference rules relevant to object creation are given in Figure 3.15, they
cover the statements of new object creation via object literal and new keyword. Because
new operation actually creates a prototype chain for resulting new object to inheritance
fields, more explanations are shown below:
• In [sl-obj-crt-literal], the pre-condition starts from an empty heap part and allocates
a new heap cell for the record of object x in the post-condition.
• In [sl-obj-crt-new], when the object x is created by x′ via new operation, the post-
condition extends its heap part by adding a new cell that specifies x′ is the proto-
type of the object x.
• In [sl-obj-crt-fun], when the object x is created by function x′ via new operation,
the this internal property changed its value from the global variable window to
the newly generated object x after the execution of the invoked function body c.
Thus, the post-condition updates both pure formula and heap formula.
The inference rules for control structures, including sequential composition, condi-
tional and while-loops, are standard as in Hoare logic, as shown in Figure 3.16, we omit
their description for brevity:
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r = [f1 : e1, ..., fn : en]
{Π ‖ emp} x = {f1 : e1, .., fn : en} {Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r}
[sl-obj-crt-literal]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r} x = new x′() {Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ (∃x · x 7→[@proto : x′])} [sl-obj-crt-new]
Σ ≡ (Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto:locop, this:locw])
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ (∃x′′ · x′′ 7→ [this : x, x1 : e1, ...xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = new x′([e1, ..., en]){Π1 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-obj-crt-fun]
Figure 3.15: Inference Rules for Object Creation
{Π ‖ Σ}c1{Π1 ‖ Σ1} {Π1 ‖ Σ1}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}c1; c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-sequential]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ}c1{Π2 ‖ Σ2} {Π∧¬b ‖ Σ}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}if (b){c1}else {c2}{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-conditional]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ}c{Π ‖ Σ}
{Π ‖ Σ}while (b){c}{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ}
[sl-iteration]
Figure 3.16: Inference Rules for Control Structures
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3.5.3 Soundness
We have defined the underlying operational semantics of our language JSsl a set
of inference rules for our axiomatic framework. We use those rules in conjunction to
logically derive theorems. Our axiomatic framework is completely described with the
soundness proof. In other words, the axiomatic framework is sound if each of its the-
orems is valid in every statements of the JSsl language. Thus we have definitions for
specification validity and soundness:
Definition 1 (Validity). A specification { ∆1 } c { ∆2 } is valid, denoted |= {P}c{Q}, if
and only if it is logically truth with respect to underlying operational semantics, denoted
as, ∀ s, h. if s, h |=∆1 and c, (s, h)→ (s′, h′) for some s′, h′, then s′, h′ |= ∆2.
Definition 2 (Soundness). Our verification framework for JSsl is sound if all prov-
able specifications under our axiomatic framework are indeed valid, denoted as, if `
{∆}c{∆2}, then |= {∆1}c{∆2}.
Based on the definition above we have a theorem for our axiomatic framework:
Theorem 1. Our axiomatic framework presented in this chapter is sound with respect
to the underlying operational semantics.
As is indicated by Definition 2 above, we need to show that, for any ∆1, c, ∆2, if
` {∆1}c{∆2}, then |= {∆1}c{∆2}. The proof can be accomplished by structural induc-
tion over c. For example, for the lookup− field statement, we have following proof:
r = [..., f : v, ...]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r}x = x′.f{(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}
[sl-lookup-field]
According to above definitions, the proof for rule [sl-lookup-field] can be written into:
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∀ s,h. if s, h |= {(∃x ·Π) ‖ x′ 7→r} and (s, h)→ (s′, h′), then s′, h′ |= {(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}
with respect to the following operational semantics:
x′ ∈ dom(s) s(x′) ∈ dom(h) f ∈ dom(h(s(x′))) h(s(x′))(f) = v
x = x′.f, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ v], h)
[op-lookup-field]
In other words, the goal is to to prove the satisfiability of s′, h′ |= {(∃x·Π)∧x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}.
The proof details is shown as follow:
Take any program state σ such that (s, h) |= {(∃x·Π) ‖ x′ 7→r}. Under our operational
semantics, we have x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s′, h′), where (s′, h′) = (s[x 7→ v], h). The goal is
turned to prove the following satisfiability:
s[x 7→ v], h |= {(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}
The semantic domain in Figure 3.11 shows us that the goal can be turned to prove
that:
s[x 7→ v] |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v and s[x 7→ v], h |= x′ 7→r
Due to h = x′ 7→ r, thus we will always have h |= x′ 7→r. According to Figure 3.12,
to prove that s[x 7→ v] |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v, we only need to prove that:
s[x 7→ v] |= Π and s[x 7→ v] |= (x = v)
Due to s |= Π, we will always have s[x 7→ v] |= Π. As we know that f ∈ dom(h(s(x′)))
and h(s(x′))(f) = v, thus we will always have s[x 7→ v] |= (x = v). Note that the value v
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could be s a primitive value or the reference if it is a reference type value (e.g. function
type value). Therefore, we will always have (s[x 7→ v], h) |= {(∃x · Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}.
The soundness proof of the axiomatic framework JSsl is done by structural induction
over program statement and the details are in Appendix A on page 149.
3.6 Summary
We have described a new approach to verify the functional correctness of the JSsl
programs that have pointer-based data structures. We give the definitions of the target
programming language, a substantial subset of JavaScript, JSsl , which captures the core
features and behaviours of JavaScript, such as prototype inheritance, function object,
and automatic object amplifying on the fly. For the purpose to prove the soundness of
our approach, we employ the operational semantics for our language and the semantic
model for the specification language. Meanwhile, the specification language is introduced
as a variant of separation logic and given a sound axiomatic framework. More detailed
proof of the feasibility of our approach can be found from the experimental results in
Chapter 5 and the appendix. This chapter is illustrated as the foundations to verify
more properties of our language. In the next chapter, we turn to verify safety property
in a more expressive subset JS tsl program.
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JS tsl - A safe usage of this for JSsl
Logical assertions can be used in formal verification in such a way that a rig-
orous standard is established for proofs about computer programs , including
proof of correctness, safety. – R.W. Floyd (Computer scientist in Stanford
University)
4.1 Introduction
One of the usages of JavaScript is constructing third party applications (guest codes)
that embedded in a host page (host codes). The host page, a publisher, rents a portion
of its web page to third party’s network, such as publishing advertisement or applica-
tions. These third parties provide content that the browser displays on the user’s screen.
Malicious third parties could find a way that not only exploit the trust relationship be-
tween the publisher and users, but also inject malicious JavaScript code into a honest
host page for attacking users. These attacks need to be prevented to improve the degree
of safety for users.
The design decision was taken to focus on how to ensure that guest codes are safe
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with respect to host page. Essentially, the unsafe interferences 1 between guest and
host are caused by directly or indirectly manipulating the global object (the window
2 object). The way of accessing the window object is through the usage of this in a
function execution context. For manipulating the use of this, JSsl is extended to JS
t
sl
for rendering this expression. In JS tsl , a function treated as a field is called a method.
This provides an interpretation for this variable as this can be bound to either the
global object or a newly created object during the execution of the functions.
Consider the example JavaScript program in Figure 4.1. The code is used to show
certain essential features of the language, including object structure, alias variable, func-
tion invocation. In Figure 4.1, an object obj is literally declared with two fields, x is a
primitive type variable who has integer value 0, setX is a function who is initiated as a
method. In line 10, window.x statement returns undefined because the field x is not
a global variable but a local variable for obj. The global object window can only reach
the variables in the global scope, such as obj itself. However, it returns 10 in line 21
because the function is invoked and x has been implicitly attached as a global variable
because of the execution of the function body statements. obj.setX(10) is applied in the
line 12, this is bound to obj at this point. In the same figure, however, in the line 15,
f(90) actually behaves that the execution makes this bound to the global object window,
because the reference obj.setX is bound to f who is a global variable and the function
invocation is under the global context. In fact, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1, this is an
implicit variable to all JavaScript functions but its value behaves differently depending
on the different type of function invocation with respect to this.
Since this could potentially point to the global object, the solution from many re-
searches is to prohibit the use of this in guest code to restrict it to access the global
object. Due to the script source codes can be arbitrary embedded within HTML file,
1An unsafe interference is about how the guest code achieves unauthorised accesses to the variables
in the host page. For example, the guest code is able to manipulate the global object window of the host
page.
2In the context of browser environment, the global object is window object.
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1 <html>
2 . . . . . .
3 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
4 var obj = {
5 x : 0 ,
6 setX : function (n) { t h i s . x = n ; }
7 } ;
8
9 // window i s the name o f the g l o b a l ob j e c t in Web Browsers
10 window . x ; // undef ined
11
12 obj . setX ( 1 0 ) ;
13 obj . x ; //10
14 f = obj . setX ;
15 f ( 9 0 ) ;
16
17 // obj . x was not updated
18 obj . x ; //10
19
20 //window . x was c rea ted
21 window . x ; //90
22 </s c r i p t>
23 . . . . . .
24 </html>
Figure 4.1: Example of this variable manipulation in JavaScript
thus any guest codes can be mashed up with the host codes without causing semantic
modification. It means that all the script codes can be semantically bound together
under the < script > ... < /script > tags. Therefore, a fragment of code may be di-
rectly or indirectly considered as malicious scripts as long as the value of this variable
is innocently or maliciously altered to point to window object.
In this chapter we aim to provide a solution that allows the guest code to accommo-
date this variable. To analyse both innocent and malicious operations on this variable,
we provide an elegant reachability graph analysis to show all the reachability relation-
ships among the object, an axiomatic framework is constructed to verify this safe prop-
erty. The reachability graph is another approach to verify programs in a visualised way.
The reason why we adopted the reachability graph is that the Hoare Triple axiomatic
system is a verification method in the mathematical and logical way, but the reachabil-
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ity graph visualises the evolution of program states by steps, which can be assisting the
readers to understand the meaning of the program status that is written by Hoare logic
style specifications.
4.2 Example Analysis
To analyse the JavaScript program in Figure 4.1, firstly we transform it to a JS tsl
program in semantic-preserving way (see Figure 4.2). Secondly, the program is illustrated
by our reachability graph analysis. Note that, further definition and explanation about
reachability analysis are seen in Section 4.3. In this section, we present an overview of
how the reachability graph analysis is able to extract the relationships among objects
and discover the value modification of this explicitly or implicitly.
Furthermore, we view the program as a generator for data structures. And the data
structures allocated in the heap are summarised by making a reachability graph. The re-
lationships among the data structures are modelled as reachability between nodes, which
one node corresponds to possible other nodes in the heap. The major issue is how to ma-
nipulate the heap cells to associate with which nodes, and with the growth of data struc-
tures how to manage the relationships for every heap cells. Our reachability graph con-
tains nodes to represent program labels and edges to represent heap references. In Figure
4.3, we show the notations definition in our reachability graph. The circle node represents
global label node (label node) that refers to a program label defined in the global con-
text, the diamond node represents the primitive type value of variables that are located
in the global scope only, the rectangle node represents single object heap region node
who refers to a disjointed heap cell that might be referenced by an object. A heap
region node consists of its reference address and a reachability state which indicates a
set of objects that the given object can reach. The shaded summary heap region node
represents the newest state 1 of the corresponding object node. The heap region node
1A newest state is a special heap region node for a function, which contains all the reachability states
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1 obj = {
2 x : 0 ,
3 setX : func (n) { t h i s . x = n }
4 } ;
5
6 n1= window . x ; // undef ined
7
8 n2 = obj . setX ( 1 0 ) ;
9
10 n3 = obj . x ; //10
11
12 f = obj . setX ;
13
14 n4= f ( 9 0 ) ;
15
16 n5 = obj . x ; //10
17
18 n6 = window . x //90
Figure 4.2: Example of this variable manipulation in JS tsl
with M label on the top right represents the multiple objects heap region node that
may be referenced by more than one object nodes. Note that we presume that the heap
cell for a function invocation is automatically collected by Garbage Collector when the
invocation is finished. And a new invocation operation located in the same cell where it
might be collected previously. All the above nodes can be connected by reference edge
that represents the heap references. One object can reach another object if there exists
an edge from the first object to the second object.
We analyse the example in Figure 4.2 by using reachability graph, the analysis begins
from the line one that literately create object obj with field x and setX. Figure 4.4
presents the analysis results for it. At the beginning, obj is a label node that can be
reached by window object at this point. The reference edge is established from the label
node obj to the heap region node that is composed of the heap address Addr obj and a
reachability state set. The reachability state shows that label node obj can reach the
heap region node Addr x and Addr setX respectively. The local field x is initialized by
integer value 0 and another local field setX is preprocessed as a method.
occurring in the original function
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Figure 4.3: Reachability Graph Notations
Figure 4.5 presents the reachability graph immediately after line 6. A new label
node has been created for n1 who has undefined value. Besides, the heap region node
Addr window updates its reachability state with object n1, and a new reference edge
is generated from 〈 Addr window, n1, undefined 〉.
As in Figure 4.6, it represents the analysis result after line 8, the method setX is
called by obj with certain argument, the new object n2 is established with edge reference
linked to undefined value. The function initialisation (function body and parameter)
of setX is stored in a independent part of cell, it would be activated when it is invoked.
A new shaped heap region node becomes visible in the graph since the execution of the
function invocation statement obj.setX(10). Note that heap regions are shaded only
when they are summary node. A new reference edge setX is generated and linked from
the caller node Addr obj to the callee summary node Addr setX. The reference edge
from Addr window to undefined is updated to a set {n1, n2}. Meanwhile, the value of
the node Addr x is updated to 10 after we executed the function body of setX.
Figure 4.7 shows the reachability graph after the assignment of n3 = obj.x. It creates
reference edges 〈 Addr window, n3, 10 〉. At this point, the reachability state for the
summary node Addr setX remains the latest value for primitive variable x who has
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Figure 4.4: Reachability graph after line 1
Figure 4.5: Reachability graph after line 6
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Figure 4.6: Reachability graph after line 8
integer value 10 which leads the return value for label n3 to 10.
Figure 4.8 presents the reachability graph after line 12. A new label node is created
for f and the reachability state for the node Addr window is updated to include f . It
also creates two reference edges 〈 Addr window, f , Addr setX 〉 and 〈 f , Addr setX 〉
respectively.
In Figure 4.9, it presents the reachability graph result after that the line 14, method
setX is invoked with parameter 90 in the context of global scope. Essentially, a new label
node n4 is created and the multiple object summary heap region node Addr setX() is
updated for altering the value of this to window. A few new reference edges are created,
such as 〈 Addr window, x, 90 〉, 〈 n4, undefined 〉,〈 Addr window, n4, undefined 〉.
In Figure 4.10, we have the reachability graph after line 16, it implies that the value
of x that is reachable by Addr obj remains 10, but the global variable x that is reachable
by Addr window has value 90. A label node is created for n5 pointing to 10. Meanwhile,
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Figure 4.7: Reachability graph after line 10
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Figure 4.8: Reachability graph after line 12
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Figure 4.9: Reachability graph after line 14
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references edges 〈 Addr window, n5, 10 〉 and 〈 n5, 10 〉 are also generated at this point.
Figure 4.11 presents that final reachability graph after line 18. Essentially, it creates
an additional label node n6 pointing to 90, and the reference edge 〈 Addr window, n6,
90 〉. Thus the return value for the statement n6 = window.x is 90 rather than 10.
Consider the difference of reachability graph result from Figure 4.8 to Figure 4.9, the
this variable enclosed in Addr setX multiple object node could be modified from obj
to window after the function invocation f(90) within the global scope. It is clear that
full authorisation of the webpage is accessed as long as you are able to manipulate the
global object window. Therefore, this reachability graph implies that the object n4 from
the allocation site in line 14 directs you to access full authorisation of the underlying
webpage.
4.3 Reachability Graph Analysis for JS tsl
According to our reachability graph analysis, the relationships among JS tsl program
objects can be discovered. We summarise the information in a heap by making a graph.
A node represents a heap cell. One node may correspond to possible many nodes. For
understanding which node is associated with which node, we view the program as a gen-
erator for information, the symbolic execution for each heap allocation statement adds
a new node to the graph. At the end of the extraction of program information, a reach-
ability graph is presented to have further analysis. In our reachability graph analysis,
program states can be described by reachability graphs according to the executions of
program statements (see Figure 4.12). Nodes and reference edges are essential elements
in the reachability graph analysis.
Label nodes ln ∈ NL represent the variables in programs. Global primitive nodes
pn ∈ NP represent the primitive type value of the variables located in global scope. Heap
region nodes n ∈ NH represent the data structures in heap cells. Their properties are
95
4.3 Reachability Graph Analysis for JS tsl
Figure 4.10: Reachability graph after line 16
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Figure 4.11: Reachability graph after line 18
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listed below:
• Heap region nodes can bind a single object, a multiple objects heap region node.
or a summary heap region node.
• A heap region node has two parts. One part stores the address of the underlying
heap cell. The other part is a reachability state, which stores the objects that the
given object can reach. For a function or method object, it stores the function body,
parameters and this variable. Note that, the reachability could not be propagated
to involve indirect referenced objects, only the object directly referenced by a
reference edge can be reached by the given object.
• A heap region node may have more than one reference edge pointing to or pointing
from it.
• We use shade to across a heap region node for heap region node in visualised
reachability graphs associated with an allocation site, called summary node. The
most recent objects at an allocation site are assigned or updated their heap region
node. The older object allocations are firstly copied and updated later in summary
nodes.
• We use M label on the top right for multiple objects heap region node when the
function is invoked more than one time.
Reference edges re ∈ E describe the reachability from one node to another node.
Every reference edge between heap region nodes has an associated field f ∈ F,
f ∈ F = Field
The set of reference edges E in a reachability graph is defined as follow:
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E = NL ×NH ∪ NL ×NP
= ∪ NH ×NP ∪ NH ×NP
= ∪ NH ×NH ∪ NH × F ×NH
In summary, the reachability graph analysis is to visualise the program state after
executing each statement. This analysis is so complex that is not appropriate to be
adopted for achieving our aim in this chapter, we only use it for visualising the program
status deduced in the final program state.
4.4 Verification
To adapt this analysis in our program verification, the abstract syntax of the lan-
guage is extended from JSsl to JS
t
sl by employing this as a statement. We also modify
the specification language mentioned in Chapter 3 from Specsl to Spec
t
sl . A key char-
acteristic of Spectsl is that the entire state of the language resides in the object heap.
The object heap has various data structures, the preprocessing stage creates an abstract
state ∆ (see Section 3.5.1) which consists of Π that contains all the global variables
referring to heap-insensitive information and Σ that contains the objects referring to
heap allocation information, respectively. Through this semantic-preserving program
transformation, our reachability graph is able to provide complete information of JS tsl
programs. In this section, the syntax of JS tsl program, the extended semantic rules and
inference rules are presented. Our aim is to mainly discover the assertions that modifies
the value of this enclosed in a function to window object.
4.4.1 The Language JS tsl
The variable this is employed as an expression in the syntax of JS tsl (See Figure
4.12). The new statement FiledMutation is able to manipulate this relevant statement,
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e ∈ Exp ::= x Variable
| v Primitive Value
| p(e1, ..., en) Arithmetic or Boolean
| F ([x1, ..., xn]) Function
| this this
ee ∈ ExpFunc ::= e Exp
| func [F ]([x1, ..., xn]) {c} [named] FuncExp
c ∈ Statement ::= skip Skip
| var x = ee LocalAssignment
| x = ee GlobalAssignment
| x = x′.f FieldLookup
| e.f = ee FieldMutation
| return e Return
| x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]) FuncCall
| x = x0([e1, ..., en]) FuncCall
| x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn : een} ObjLiteral
| x = new x′() ObjCreation
| x = new x′([e1, .., en]) ObjCrtFunc
| c; c Sequencing
| if (e) {c} else {c} Condtional, b is boolean value
| while (e) {c} Iteration
Identifiers
F ∈ FuncID ::= F | F ′ | ...
f ∈ FieldID ::= f | f ′ | f1 | x | ...
b ∈ BooleanID ::= True | False
x ∈ V ariableID ::= x | x′ | x0 | ...
v ∈ V ariable ::= int | str | null | undef
[...] ::= optional
Figure 4.12: Syntax of JS tsl
such as ”this.x1 = x2”.
Table 4.1 summarises the different features of the language JSsl and JS
t
sl . In the
features row, there are object structure, function invocation, prototype inheritance,
new statement, iteration, conditional, this statement. The symbol ”4” represents
the language supports this feature. The symbol ”8” represents the language does not
support this feature.
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Feature JSsl JS
t
sl
Object Structure 4 4
Function Invocation 4 4
Prototype Inheritance 4 4
new Statement 4 4
Iteration 4 4
Conditional 4 4
this variable 8 4
Table 4.1: Features Comparison of JSsl and JS
t
sl
As you can see, each of the features from JSsl are ”inherited” to JS
t
sl language.
In addition, JS tsl program supports this expression and corresponding statements that
involve this. Therefore, JS tsl has more expressiveness than JSsl .
4.4.2 Revised Operational Semantic Rules
As the language JS tsl supports this expression, the operational semantics need to
be improved to adapt such feature. According to our previous semantics, the evaluation
of the new expression this returns either a location of a normal object or a location
locw where refers to window object. In contrast with the [op-mutate-field] rule in chapter
3, the modified rule [op-mutate-field] has its premises changed to evaluate the expression
e to a nullable location (See Figure 4.13), but he final state after the evaluation of the
statement e.f = ee remains the same.
s(e) = ` ` 6= null
` ∈ dom(h) h(`) = r s(ee) = v
e.f = ee, (s, h)→ (s, h[` 7→ [f 7→ v]])
[op-mutated-field]
Figure 4.13: Revised [op-mutate-field] Rule
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The rest of the operational semantic rules remain exactly the same as in Section 3.4.2,
which we omit to explain in this chapter.
4.4.3 Specification Language for JS tsl
Adding the use of this causes a series of chain reaction to other features of the lan-
guage, such as alias, scope chain, we provide an improved specification language Spectsl
(See Figure 4.14) to manage it. Table 4.2 summarises the difference between the language
Specsl and Spec
t
sl from the perspective of expressiveness.
Feature Specsl Spec
t
sl
Object Structure 4 4
Alias 8 4
Prototype Chain 4 4
Scope Chain 8 4
Local Variable 4 4
this 8 4
Table 4.2: Properties Comparison of Specsl and Spec
t
sl
Applying the language Spectsl in this chapter, we also need to have alteration on
the corresponding semantics model that caused by the improvement of the language
(See Figure 4.14) particularly with respect to pure formula and heap formula. The
different object identifications may point to the same location in the abstract heap h,
those identifications are alias to each other, the modification of the location content
would cause the change which their identifications map to. To deal with alias analysis,
we must identify the objects who refer to the same location. In Spectsl an alias assertion
is represented by equality and inequality of two object identifiers, such as x1 = x2. We
join two alias assertion with ∧. Note that, we also consider the case where an object
identification is alias with undefined object. Each alias assertion is found as heap-
insensitive information. In order to merge with pure formula, we remain its jointness
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Specification Specsl ::= { ∆1 } c { ∆2 }
Abstract state ∆ ::= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I
Pure formula Π ::= b | Π1∧Π2 | Π1∨Π2 | ∃x.Π | x∼e | a ∧Π
Heap formula Σ ::= emp | x 7→r | Σ1 ∗ Σ2 | Σ1 −∗Σ2 | ∃x.Σ
Boolean b ::= true | false | x | b1 = b2
Variable x ::= f | x′ | xi(i ∈ Z) | this
Fields f ::= f ′ | fi(i ∈ Z)
Expression e ::= F | v | x | const | ei(i ∈ Z)
Record r ::= [f1 : e1, .., fn : en] | e
Alias a ::= x1 = x2 | x1 6= x2 | x = undef | x 6= undef | a1 ∧ a2
Scope Chain I ::= LS
Figure 4.14: The Specification Language Spectsl
with other pure formulas by ∧, such as a ∧Π.
At this point, the style of our reasoning is not enough for JS tsl . We must also
assert scope chain information when a variable can not be resolved in its current scope.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, we have two kinds execution contexts in JS tsl
program, including global context and local context. A local context normally refers to a
scope constructed by a function statement. V ariable Object (VO) is a helper object that
refers to an execution context (global or local context). A VO contains the information
of all the local variables and parameters in the current scope. The locations of variable
objects are recorded in the scope chain, we use notation ”[ ], LS, `s : LS, LS(x.@scope)”,
where ”[ ]” is null location, LS is the current scope chain, ”`s : LS” for when location `s
is in the scope chain LS, LS(x.@scope) for when the location of the object x is attached
in the LS by internal property @scope. The root of a scope chain is global scope who
has location locgo pointing to object window. Each variable object has a pointer @proto
pointing to a prototype chain, the end of the prototype chain is object OProto who has
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location locop.
In Figure 4.15, we cater a chain mechanism for the scope and prototype lookup
feature. As you can see, the resolving object x from its current scope location `s0
follows the scope chain to the scope `s2 and eventually retrieves its value in the location
` along with the prototype chain. Note that in the process of resolving an object x, it
is resolved as a field name ”x” of the first variable object in the scope chain `s0. Then
follows the variable object’s prototype chain to its prototype object. After that, the
process moves to the next variable object who has location `s1.
Figure 4.15: Scope and Prototype Lookup Chain
To able to reason this, we extend scope list I in heap formula due to its heap-
sensitive information. The expression I is a current list of VOs, in the example of Figure
4.15, the current list of variable objects is given by I = [`s0, `s1, `s2, locgo]. Note that,
we employ LS as the current scope chain, `s ∈ LS. We distinguish a scope location `s
from a normal object location `. The newly created variable object is prepended to the
scope list I, which means I can be used to record the instant scope chain information
when it is extended by variable object.
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Figure 4.16 presents the semantic model that caters the newly added improvement of
the language Spectsl . Note that, the semantics that does not show in this figure remain
the same as defined in Specsl (See Figure 3.11).
4.4.4 Main Verification Algorithm
The specifications must be subject to a process of refinement before they can actually
be implemented. The result of such a refinement process is an executable algorithm. In
this section, we formulate our verification algorithm for safe use of this variable with
the given specification. The algorithm for refinement is given in Algorithm 1 Safe This
algorithm. Line 1 initialises the starting point of a program with given statements, pre-
condition and postcondition information. Line 2 analysis is conducted using a set of
symbolic rules to be explained in Section 4.4.6. If the symbolic execution succeeds, the
verification moves on to the second step (line 5). However, if the symbolic execution fails
at some point, where the current program state cannot satisfy the requirement of the
next instruction, the whole verification returns fail at line 15. Along such analysis, if the
verification could successfully reach the postcondition ∆pos, otherwise it returns false
for ∆pos (line 3), the reachability relationships among objects are derived. Furthermore,
the postcondition we might approach is composed of three parts, pure formula, heap
formula and scope chain information. Line 6-10 check the heap formula in postcondition
s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I iff s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, I = LS and s, h |= LS
s, h |= I iff I = LS and s, h |= LS
s |=A a1 ./ a2 iff s(a1) ./ s(a2),where ./∈ {=, 6=}
s |=A x ./ undef iff s(x) = NaN,where ./∈ {=, 6=}
s |=A a1 ∧ a2 iff s |=A a1, s |=A a2
s |=A a ∧Π iff s |=A a, s |=A Π
Figure 4.16: The Additional Semantic Model for Spectsl
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regarding this variable. Because this is a local and internal variable inside of a function.
The occurrence of this in the postcondition must infer that it also occurs in the pre-
condition. Therefore, if no occurrences of this in the precondition and postcondition, it
returns safe. The forward analysis deals with the case of this occurs in the specification.
It returns safe when this variable is not able to reach window object. If the reachability
was established between this and window, the algorithm returns ”not safe”.
Definition 3 (Reachibility). Give a heap formula Σ = x 7→ r ∗ Σ1, the atomic heap
x 7→ r is reachable from a variable v if and only if the following recursively defined
relation holds:
ReachV ar(v,Σ) = (ReachV ar(v, x 7→ e) ∧ (x = v)) ∨
(ReachV ar(v, x 7→ [xr : e]) ∧ (v = xr))
The function Reach is used to analyse whether this from the postcondition can
reach window object. It is shown as below:
Reach(∆) =
⋃
v∈LV(∆)
ReachVar(v,∆) where ∆ ::= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I
This Reach(∆) function returns a set of variables that are reachable from the free
variables in the abstract state ∆.
The function ReachVar(v,Π ‖ Σ ‖ I) returns the minimal set of variables which
satisfies the following relation:
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{v} ∪ {x2 | ∃x1,Π1 · x1 ∈ ReachVar(v,Π ‖ Σ ‖ I) ∧Π = (x2 = x1 ∧Π1)}∪
{x2 | ∃x1,Σ1 · x1 ∈ ReachVar(v,Π ‖ Σ ‖ I) ∧ Σ = (x1 7→ [x2 : e] ∗ Σ1)}
⊆ ReachVar(v,∆)
Algorithm 1 Safe This Algorithm
1: procedure Safe This(c,∆pre,∆pos)
2: if {∆pre}c{∆pos} then
3: if ∆pos = false then return fail
4: else
5: ∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I
6: if this /∈ LV(Σpos) then return SAFE
7: else
8: if window /∈ Reach(∆pos) then return SAFE
9: else
10: return NOT SAFE
11: end if
12: end if
13: end if
14: else
15: return fail
16: end if
17: end procedure
4.4.5 Formal Property: Safety
According to our reachability graph analysis, we are able to produce effective reacha-
bility predicates for describing data structures on the graphs of its revolution. To prevent
the malicious use of this that could be implicitly modified to bind to the global object
window, it reduced to find the reachability predicates that indicate the value of this
variable within a function or method is unexpectedly changed to point to window. Thus
we have safety definition for JS tsl program:
Definition 4 (Safety-1).
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A statement c is safe, if the relationship between the this variable in a given abstract
state ∆pre and its transited variable this
′ in the abstract state ∆pos can be detected. That
is, this′ ∈ LV(Σpos). And the variable that are reachable from the free variable in the
state Σpos does not include the window object. That is, window /∈ Reach(∆pos).
Note that, our safety definition only consider the case when the activated statement
involves operations on functions. Because this safety issue occurs in the context of
functions. In the case of no this variable employed statement, such as postconditions
do not own this variable, it always returns safe.
Definition 5 (Safety-2). For all JS tsl statements c, if this is safe in ci (i ∈ Z), and ci
ci+1, then this is safe in ci+1.
The definition 4 shows the transitivity of safety. If the current activated statement
ci is safe, and ci  ci+1 indicates that statements move from the ith to (i + 1)th. The
expression  represents the movement of a sequence of statements. For example, if we
have a function statement x = func(n){c} as a field of a literal object obj, the invocation
obj.x(n) has been proved safe. At this point, this enclosed in obj.x(n) statement is also
safe in the next statement, except when the coming up statement is interfering the value
of this in the function statement x = func(n){c}, such as calling the function by a global
variable f , such as f(n) where f = obj.x. As it may be observed, this is considered to
be safe or unsafe with respect to its enclosed statement. In above example, this is safe
enclosed in the statement obj.x(n), but not safe enclosed in the statement f(n).
Theorem 2. A JS tsl program is safe when its all statements are safe.
Our revised axiomatic framework in this chapter employs this, but we must prove
theorem 2. It is sufficient to prove the following lemmas: 1
Lemma 1 (Safety). For a JS tsl statement ci, if the Algorithm 1 Safe This algorithm re-
turns SAFE, then ci is safe.
1Addition proof details are in the Appendix.
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Lemma 2 (Subject Reduction). For a JS tsl statement ci, if ci is safe, then ci+1 is safe.
Those lemmas are proved by the induction of inference rules (see Section: 4.4.6).
However, we have to ensure that our revised semantic rules do not violate the previous
semantic model in chapter 3 and safety (lemma 1).
4.4.6 Revised Inference Rules
For our reasoning rules, we employ α logic predicate to present the reasoning about
scope chain. To consider resolving a variable, walk down the variable object from the
scope chain when searching for a variable x can not be found in its current scope. What
is of interest to us is the order in which variable objects will be checked. Notice that
the variable x will be searched following by @proto pointer when it is recognised in a
variable object location. The α predicate is to precisely capture the VOs that must be
checked.
In Figure 4.17, we define the semantics for α predicate by satisfaction relation. The
predicate α([LLS], ` : LS, x, `) holds only for abstract heap h such that the variable x can
be resolved in the variable object location (or a prototype of the object) at location `.
The first argument [LLS] in our predicate ”precisely” specifies the concrete locations in
heap cells which must be visited, it determine the tracks of scope list. For example, recall
the illustration in Figure 4.15, if the prototype of the heap cell `s2 has location `
′, the
predicate α([[`s0], [`s1], [`s2, `
′, `]], I, x, `s2) is satisfied by the abstract heap h possessing
the variable x and internal property @proto for the objects who have location `′, `. Note
that it is not necessary to walk down every VO, the visit stops at the point of discovering
location of the variable x.
We update the inference rules to deal with scope chain, and this features expended
in JS tsl regarding safety property reasoning. The assertion language of the JS
t
sl remains
the same as in Section 3.5.1. Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19, Figure 4.20, Figure 4.21 present
the revised inference rules. In those rules, the pure formula and heap formula of the
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program abstract state remain the same as mentioned in Chapter3 except the scope
chain information I. The rules we mainly explain are the ones who has effect on the
revision of the current scope chain information.
In Figure 4.18, we explain rule [sl-glob-assign2], after a function object is globally
created, the Variable Object of this function object is attached at a specific location in
the scope chain list. The postcondition formula LS(x.@scope) adds location (`sx) into LS
by linking through @scope internal property. For rule [sl-local-assign2], the precondition
has OV location `sx0 is the scope chain LS. For example the function object x is declared
inside of the function x0, the `sx0 has already existed in the scope chain LS. After the
execution of the location function assignment statement, the postcondition adds the OV
location (`sx) into LS, the scope chain is updated from I to I
′. For the rest of the rules in
Figure 4.18, the execution of their statements do not alter the status of the scope chain.
In Figure 4.19, the execution of their statements do not alter the status of the scope
chain because that a function need to be defined first before its invocation. Thus in each
precondition, we have the formula I
.
= `sx0 : LS that is OV location of the function object
x0 in the scope chain. The postcondition remains the same scope chain information as
in the precondition.
In Figure 4.20, the precondition of the rule [sl-obj-crt-fun] has the OV location `s′x in
the scope chain LS, its postcondition adds a new OV location (`sx) into L by the formula
I′ .= (x.@scope).
s, h |= α([ ], [ ], ,null) iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |= α([LLS], ` : LS, x, `) iff ∃h1, h2, `, v · h1#h2 and h = h1 ∗ h2
and ` ∈ dom(h1) and h1(`)(x) = v
and ` ∈ dom(h2) and ` : `s and `s : LS
Figure 4.17: Logic Predicate Semantic Model for Spectsl
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{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}skip{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-skip]
{Π[e/x] ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = e{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-glob-assign1]
{Π ‖ Σ[e/x] ‖ I .= LS}var x = e{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-local-assign1]
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
{Π ‖ emp ‖ I .= LS}x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-glob-assign2]
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x0 7→ r0 x0 ∈ Func
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
x /∈ LV(Σ) I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r) ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-local-assign2]
r = [..., f : v, ...]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-field]
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) f /∈ dom(r)
r(@proto) = x′′ {Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.f{Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-proto]
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
f /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-undef]
r = [..., f : v, ...] or else f /∈ dom(r)
{Π ‖ x 7→r ‖ I .= LS}x.f = ee{Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee] ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-mutate-field]
Figure 4.18: Updated Inference Rules for Variable Assignments and Field Statements
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Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..] ∗ x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...]
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this: x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2} I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I′ .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-obj]
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) x0 /∈ dom(r) r(@proto) = x′′ I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′ ‖ I′ .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-proto]
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
x1 /∈ LV(Σ) I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-fun-undef]
Σ ≡ (Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1...xn),@proto:locfp, ...])
Σ1 ≡ (Σ ∗ x′ 7→ [this: locw, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1 ‖ I}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I1} I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-dir]
{Π[e/res] ‖ Σ ‖ I}return e{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I} [sl-return]
Figure 4.19: Updated Inference Rules for Function Invocation
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r = [f1 : e1, ..., fn : en]
{Π ‖ emp ‖ I .= LS} x = {f1 : e1, .., fn : en} {Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-obj-crt-literal]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS} x = new x′() {Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ (∃x · x 7→[@proto : x′]) ‖ I .= LS} [sl-obj-crt-new]
Σ ≡ (Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto:locop,this:locw])
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ (∃x′′ · x′′ 7→ [this: x, x1 : e1, ...xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2} I .= `sx′ :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = new x′([e1, ..., en]){Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-obj-crt-fun]
Figure 4.20: Updated Inference Rules for Object Creation
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1{Π1 ‖ Σ1 ‖ I1 .= LS}
{Π1 ‖ Σ1 ‖ I1 .= LS}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1; c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
[sl-sequential]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}if (b){c1}else {c2}{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
[sl-conditional]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I′ .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}while (b){c}{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ ‖ I′ .= LS}
[sl-iteration]
Figure 4.21: Updated Inference Rules for Control Structures
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4.4.7 Soundness
Based on the definition above we have a theorem for our axiomatic framework in this
chapter:
Theorem 3. Our axiomatic framework presented in Chapter 4 is sound with respect to
the underlying operational semantics.
The soundness proof of the axiomatic frameworks presented in this chapter are in
the appendixes B on page 158.
4.5 Summary
It is both practical and challenging problem to verify both function correctness and
safety of heap-manipulating JS tsl program. In this chapter, we provide an axiomatic
framework to solving it by inferring expected specification mainly for this variable re-
lated statement from their calling contexts. The framework is proven sound and the
JS tsl program is proven correct on condition that the function definition and invocation
statement meet the inferred specifications. We employ a forward program reachability
analysis over the inferred specification to synthesise the specifications of the this safe.
In our next chapter, we evaluate the viability of the proposed approach.
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Case Studies and Evaluation
A case study is one which investigates the scenario that can only be stud-
ied or understood in context to answer specific research questions and which
seeks a range of different kinds of evidence, evidence which is there in the
case setting, and which has to be abstracted and collated to get the best possi-
ble answers to the research questions – Bill Gillham (Computer scientist in
Glasgow University)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter contains two parts, the part one presents the case studies of JS tsl
verification framework. Part two is the evaluation of the framework by a comparison
work between the JS tsl framework and other frameworks.
5.2 Case Studies
There are four case studies used to evaluate the JS tsl framework in terms of verifying
functional correctness and safety. Case study A is employed to show that the framework
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is capable of processing the flexible and complex features of JavaScript language by
using the example presented in Chapter 3. Case study B and C are used to show that
the framework can detect unsafe JavaScript applications before causing catastrophic
problems. The case study D shows the scenario that cause the JS tsl framework to be
failed.
Each case study is presented in four phases:
Phase 1: Program translation
This phase shows the translation from a JavaScript program to a JS tsl program
in a semantic preserving approach. Each expression and statement of JavaScript
program is rewritten in JS tsl language for further analysis. As matter as fact,
the translation of a JavaScript program to JS tsl can be fully automated by using
syntax tree generators. Firstly, a JavaScript program can be translated into a
syntax tree, which represents an abstract syntactic structure of source code of the
program. The JS tsl program is generated automatically by the syntax tree.
Phase 2: Program analysis
This phase contains two parts. Part one presents the given program specifications
from users which are requested to be proved functional correctness. The specifi-
cations are expressed in the form of {P}C{Q}, C is program statement, P and Q
are assertions written in Spectsl language.
Part two reveals how the inference rules can be applied to automatically analyse a
JS tsl program. The analysis begins from an initial precondition assertion ∆pre, it
has value {true ‖ emp ‖ I} where the pure formula is true, the heap formula is
empty, and the predicate for describing scope chains is I. It produces a postcon-
dition assertion ∆pos that specifies the final status of program.
Therefore, if the postcondition assertions match the requested specification from
users, it shows that functional correctness of programs is proved, otherwise the
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system fails to verify functional correctness.
Phase 3: Algorithm application
In this phase, the postcondition assertion ∆pos produced in the phase 2 will be
used as a parameter in the execution of ”Safe This” algorithm that is defined in
Section 4.4.4. The output of this phase produces the detection result of safety for
programs.
Phase 4: Result
In this phase, the result of applying verification framework JS tsl will be directly
shown to users whether or not the given program is safe.
5.2.1 Case Study A
The case study A employs the JavaScript program example that is presented in
Chapter 3, Section 3.3 (see Figure 5.1). In this example, it shows the flexible features of
JavaScript including object literal, nested function, prototype inheritance, and dynamic
features including the generation of an object field on the fly. The analysis should indi-
cate that this is a safe program. More detailed description of this example is shown in
Section 3.3 .
Phase 1: Program translation
The input of this phase is the JavaScript program showed in Figure 5.1. The output
is a semantically equivalent JS tsl program shown in Figure 5.2.
Phase 2: Program Analysis
According to the specification language Spectsl defined in Section 4.4.3, the given
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1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var obj = {
3 f1 : 1 ,
4 f 2 : function (n) {
5 var g = function ( ) {
6 i f (n >= 10) { re turn 2 ;}
7 else { re turn 3 ;}
8 }
9 re turn g ( ) ;
10 }
11 } ;
12 a l e r t ( obj . f 2 ( 1 1 ) ) ; //2
13 a l e r t ( obj . f 3 ) ; // undef ined
14 obj . f 3 = 5 ;
15 a l e r t ( obj . f 3 ) ; //5
16 r e s = obj . f 2 ( 1 ) ; //3
17 a l e r t ( r e s ) ;
18 </s c r i p t>
Figure 5.1: JavaScript for Case Study A
1 obj = {
2 f1 : 1 ,
3 f 2 : func (n) {
4 var g = func ( ) {
5 i f ( ge (n , 1 0 ) ) { re turn 2 }
6 e l s e { re turn 3 }
7 }
8 var x = g ( ) ;
9 re turn x
10 }
11 } ;
12 n1 = obj . f 2 ( 1 1 ) ;
13 n2 = obj . f 3 ;
14 obj . f 3 = 5 ;
15 n3 = obj . f 3
16 r e s = obj . f 2 (1 )
Figure 5.2: JS tsl for Case Study A (Phase 1)
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specifications that are requested to be proved are given as:
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
C
{n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖ obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ‖ I′}
where C is a sequence of JS tsl statements.
There are several definitions defined in this phase for assisting the proof in the
later phases. These definitions are:
• Of2 represents the function object referred to by f2.
Of2 = [body : {var g = func(){if (ge(n, 10)){return 2; }
else {return 3; }};
var x = g(); return x},
params : (n),@proto : OProto]
• Og represents the function object referred to g.
Og = [body : if(ge(n, 10)) {return 2; }else {return 3; }
params : (),@proto : OProto]
Figure 5.3 shows that the analysis process is in the form of ”{precondition} C
{postcondition}”. The inference rules that are applied are [sl-obj-crt-literal], [sl-fun-call-obj],
[sl-lookup-undef],[sl-mutate-filed], [sl-lookup-field], and [sl-fun-call-obj]. A summary of
output in this phase is a final postcondition assertion and is given as:
∆pos = {∃n1, n2, n3, res · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .] ‖ I′ .=
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{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
obj = {f1 : 1, f2 : . . .}; [sl-obj-crt-literal]
{true ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2] ‖ I}
n1 = obj.f2(11); [sl-fun-call-obj]
{true ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ‖ I}
var g = func(){...};
{true ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .]∗
g 7→ Og ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
var x = g();
{true ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .]∗
g 7→ Og ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
if(ge(n, 10)){return 2}else {return 3};
{∃x · true ∧ x = 2 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ∗ g 7→ Og ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
return x;
{∃n1 · true ∧ n1 = 2 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ∗ g 7→ Og ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
[sl-glob-assign2]
[sl-fun-call-dir]
[sl-conditional]
{∃n1 · true ∧ n1 = 2 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ∗ g 7→ Og ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
n2 = obj.f3; [sl-lookup-undef]
{∃n1, n2 · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
obj.f3 = 5; [sl-mutate-field]
{∃n1, n2 · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
n3 = obj.f3; [sl-lookup-field]
{∃n1, n2, n3 · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 11, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
res = obj.f2(1) [sl-fun-call-obj]
{∃n1, n2, n3, res · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
Figure 5.3: Program Analysis for Case Study A (Phase 2)
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LS(g.@scope)}
As you can see, ∆pos not only matches the given specifications requested to be
proved, but also provides more information about programs, which is f2 7→ [this :
obj, x1 : 11, . . .] located in the heap. Therefore, the analysis shows that the pro-
grams are functional correct.
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Phase 3: Algorithm Application
The algorithm SAFE THIS(C,∆pre,∆pos) has three different inputs, C, ∆pre, and
∆pos. The parameter C is the given program as shown in Figure 5.2. The parameter
∆pre and ∆pos are:
∆pre = {true ‖ emp ‖ I}
∆pos = {∃n1, n2, n3, res · true ∧ n1 = 2 ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
procedure Execu SAFE THIS(c,∆pre, ∆pos)
if {∆pre} c {∆pos} then [Algorithm1− line2]
if {true ‖ emp ‖ I}}c{∃n1, n2, n3, res · true ∧ n1 = 2
∧n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2
7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}then
∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I [Algorithm1− line5]
∆pos = { ∃n1, n2, n3, res · true ∧ n1 = 2
∧n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 5 ∧ res = 3 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5] ∗ f2
7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .] ‖ I′ .= LS(g.@scope)}
if this ∈ LV(Σpos) then [Algorithm1− line7]
this ∈ LV(∃obj · obj 7→ [f1 : 1, f2 : Of2, f3 : 5]∗
f2 7→ [this : obj, x1 : 1, . . .])
if window /∈ Reach(∆pos) then return SAFE [Algorithm1− line8]
window /∈ {this} ∪ {obj, f2} ∪ {f1, f2, f3, this, x1}
Figure 5.4: Algorithm Application for Case Study A (Phase 3)
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Figure 5.4 shows that the procedure Execu SAFE THIS executes the codes on line2,
line5, line7, and line8 of Safe This algorithm. It starts from the line2 ([Algorithm1-
line2 ]). As the ∆pos is not false, the algorithm reaches the line5 ([Algorithm1-
line5 ]) ∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I. Since ∆pos contains the variable this in its
heap formula Σpos, the execution continues to the line7 ([Algorithm1-line7 ]). The
safety check leads the execution to the line8 ([Algorithm1-line8 ]) and produces the
results that the given program is safe as the value of this in the final assertion is
not window.
Phase 4: Result
Therefore, after the execution of these three phases, the JS tsl framework reveals
that the given program is safe because the value of this is neither innocently nor
maliciously modified to be window.
5.2.2 Case Study B
The case study B employs the JavaScript example (see Figure 5.5) from Gardner et
al. (GMS12). This example reveals the complexity of language in terms of prototype
inheritance and scope chain. There are global variables x, y, z, f, v. The variable x, y, z
are initialised with value null. A function f declares a global variable v with integer
value 4, a local variable v. The correct output value of the variable x, y, z is undefined,
4, and 5 respectively. .
Phase 1: Program translation
The JavaScript code in Figure 5.5 transforms into a JS tsl program in a semantic
preserving way as shown in Figure 5.6.
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1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 x = n u l l ;
3 y = n u l l ;
4 z = n u l l ;
5 f = function (w) {
6 x = v ;
7 v = 4 ;
8 var v ;
9 y = v ;
10 } ;
11 v = 5 ;
12 f ( n u l l ) ;
13 z = v ;
14 </s c r i p t>
Figure 5.5: JavaScript for Case Study B
1 x = n u l l ;
2 y = n u l l ;
3 z = n u l l ;
4 f = func (w) {
5 x = v ;
6 var v = 4 ;
7 y = v
8 } ;
9 v = 5 ;
10 g= f ( n u l l ) ;
11 z = v
Figure 5.6: JS tsl for Case Study B (Phase 1)
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Phase 2: Program Analysis
According to the specification language Spectsl defined in Section 4.4.3, the given
specifications that are requested to be proved are given as:
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
C
{true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5 ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef ‖ f 7→ Of ‖ I′}
where C is a sequence of JS tsl programs.
The definition of Of is:
• Of represents the function object referred to by f.
Of = [body : {x = v; v = 4; varv; y = v}, params : (w),@proto : OProto]
Figure 5.7 indicates the analysis process using the set of inference rules that are
defined in section 4.4.6. The analysis begins from an initial precondition {true ‖
emp ‖ I}. The inference rules that are applied are [sl-glo-assign1], [sl-glob-assign2],
[sl-fun-call-dir],[sl-local-assign1], and [sl-lookup-undef]. A summary of output in this
phase is a final postcondition assertion and is given as:
{∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5 ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef
‖ f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
Phase 3: Algorithm Application
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{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
x = null; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = null ‖ emp ‖ I}
y = null; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = null ∧ y = null ‖ emp ‖ I}
z = null; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = null ∧ y = null ∧ z = null ‖ emp ‖ I}
f = func(w){...}; [sl-glob-assign2]
{true ∧ x = null ∧ y = null ∧ z = null ‖ f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
v = 5; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = null ∧ y = null ∧ z = null ∧ v = 5 ‖ f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
g = f(null); [sl-fun-call-dir]
{true ∧ x = null ∧ y = null ∧ z = null ∧ v = 5 ‖ f 7→ Of ∗
f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
x = v; v = 4; var v; y = v
{true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = null ∧ v = 5 ‖ f 7→ Of ∗
f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
[sl-glob-assign1]
[sl-local-assign1]
[sl-lookup-undef]
{∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = null ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef
‖ f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
z = v; [sl-glob-assign1]
{∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5 ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef
‖ f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
Figure 5.7: Program Analysis for Case Study B (Phase 2)
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In the algorithm application phase, the algorithm SAFE THIS(C,∆pre,∆pos) is
applied to examine and determine whether the given program is safe in terms of
execution of this variable. The inputs of algorithm are C, ∆pre, and ∆pos, The
parameter C is the given program as shown in Figure 5.6. The parameter ∆pre and
∆pos are:
∆pre = {true ‖ emp ‖ I}
∆pos = {∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5 ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef
‖ f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
Figure 5.8 shows that Execu SAFE THIS executes the codes on line2, line5, line7,
and line10 of the algorithm. The result analysed at line7 ([Algorithm1-line7 ]) in-
dicates that ∆pos contains the variable this pointing to the location locw which is
the location for window object. Therefore, the line10 ([Algorithm1-line10 ]) shows
that the object window can be reached.
Phase 4: Result
Therefore, after the execution of these three phases, the JS tsl framework has proved
that the given program is not safe because it modified the value of this pointing
to window either innocently or maliciously.
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procedure Execu SAFE THIS(c,∆pre, ∆pos)
if {∆pre} c {∆pos} then [Algorithm1− line2]
if {true ‖ emp ‖ I}}c{∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5∧
v = 5 ∧ g = undef ‖
f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}then
∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I [Algorithm1− line5]
∆pos = {∃g · true ∧ x = undef ∧ y = 4 ∧ z = 5 ∧ v = 5 ∧ g = undef
‖ f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...] ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
if this ∈ LV(Σpos) then [Algorithm1− line7]
this ∈ LV(f 7→ Of ∗ f ′ 7→ [this: locw, w : null, ...])
if window ∈ Reach(∆pos) then return NOT SAFE [Algorithm1− line10]
window ∈ {f, f ′} ∪ {this, w}
Figure 5.8: Algorithm Application for Case Study B (Phase 3)
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5.2.3 Case Study C
The case study C employs the example (see Figure 5.9) in the Chapter 4. This
example shows the possibility of a host page compromised through the modification of
this value.
Phase 1: Program translation
In the translation phase, Figure 5.10 shows the translated JS tsl program. In the
line 1-4, a literal object obj is declared to contain the fields x and setX. In
the line 5, the statement window.x returns undefined because there is no such
variable x declared in the global scope. In the line 5-7, the fields x and setX are
called through the object obj. In the line 8, it shows that a variable f and the
identification obj.setX are alias. In the line 6, it is a function invocation. After
this invocation, it changes the variable x from a local variable to a global variable.
In the line 10, the statement obj.x still returns 10. In the line 11, the statement
window.x returns 90 is because the variable x has become a global variable.
Phase 2: Program Analysis
According to the specification language Spectsl defined in Section 4.4.3, the given
1 var obj = {
2 x : 0 ,
3 setX : function (n) { t h i s . x = n ; }
4 } ;
5 window . x ;
6 obj . setX ( 1 0 ) ;
7 obj . x ;
8 f = obj . setX ;
9 f ( 9 0 ) ;
10 obj . x ;
11 window . x ;
Figure 5.9: JavaScript for Case Study C
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1 obj = {
2 x : 0 ,
3 setX : func (n) { t h i s . x = n }
4 } ;
5 n1= window . x ; // undef ined
6 n2 = obj . setX ( 1 0 ) ;
7 n3 = obj . x ; //10
8 f = obj . setX ;
9 n4= f ( 9 0 ) ;
10 n5 = obj . x ; //10
11 n6 = window . x //90
Figure 5.10: JS tsl for Case Study C (Phase 1)
specifications that are requested to be proved are given as:
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
C
{n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖
obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX ‖ I′}
where C is a sequence of JS tsl programs.
The definition of OsetX is:
• OsetX represents the function object referred to by setX.
OsetX = [body : {this.x = n}, params : (n),@proto : OProto]
Figure 5.11 indicates the analysis process using the set of inference rules that
is described in section 4.4.6. The analysis begins from an initial precondition
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}. The inference rules that are applied contains [sl-obj-crt-literal],
[sl-lookup-undef], [sl-fun-call-obj],[sl-fun-call-dir], A summary ofoutput in this phase is
a final postcondition assertion and is given as:
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{∃n1, n2,n3,n4, f, n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef
∧ f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]
∗ setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I .= `sf :LS}.
Phase 3: Algorithm Application
In this phase, the parameter ∆pre and ∆pos of algorithm SAFE THIS(C,∆pre,∆pos)
are:
∆pre = {true ‖ emp ‖ I}
∆pos = {∃n1, n2,n3, n4, f,n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10∧
n4 = undef ∧ f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→
[x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I .= `sf :LS}
Figure 5.12 shows that the procedure Execu SAFE THIS executes the codes on line2,
line5, line7, and line10 of the algorithm. It starts from the line2 ([Algorithm1-
line2 ]). As the ∆pos is not false, the algorithm1 reaches the line5 ([Algorithm1-
line5 ]) ∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I. Since ∆pos contains the variable this in its
heap formula Σpos, the execution continues to the line7 ([Algorithm1-line7 ]). The
safety check leads the execution to the line10 ([Algorithm1-line10 ]).
Phase 4: Result
Therefore, after the execution of these three phases, the JS tsl framework shows
that the given program is not safe as the this variable in the assertion can be
pointing to window.
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{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
obj = {x : 0, setX : func(n){. . .}}; [sl-obj-crt-literal]
{true ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 0, setX : OsetX] ‖ I}
n1 = window.x; [sl-lookup-undef]
{∃n1 · true ∧ n1 = undef ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 0, setX : OsetX] ‖ I}
n2 = obj.setX(10); [sl-fun-call-obj]
{∃n1,n2 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]∗
setX 7→ [@this : obj,n : 10, x = 10 . . .] ‖ I .= `ssetX :LS}
n3 = obj.x; [sl-lookup-field]
{∃n1,n2,n3 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : obj,n : 10, x = 10 . . .] ‖ I}
f = obj.setX;
n4 = f(90); [sl-fun-call-dir]
{∃n1,n2,n3 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : obj,n : 10, x = 10 . . .] ‖ I}
this.x = n;
{∃n1,n2,n3 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I}
[sl-mutate-field]
{∃n1,n2,n3,n4, f · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef
∧f = undef ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]
∗setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I .= `sf :LS}
n5 = obj.x; [sl-lookup-field]
{∃n1,n2,n3,n4, f,n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef
∧f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]
∗setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I .= `sf :LS}
n6 = window.x; [sl-lookup-field]
{∃n1,n2,n3,n4, f,n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef ∧ n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef
∧f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖ ∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]
∗setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .] ‖ I .= `sf :LS}
Figure 5.11: Program Analysis for Case Study C (Phase 2)
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procedure Execu SAFE THIS(c,∆pre, ∆pos)
if {∆pre} c {∆pos} then [Algorithm1− line2]
if {true ‖ emp ‖ I}}c{∃n1,n2,n3,n4, f,n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef∧
n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef ∧ f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .]
‖ I .= `sf :LS}then
∆pos := Πpos ‖ Σpos ‖ I [Algorithm1− line5]
∆pos = {∃n1,n2,n3,n4, f,n5 · true ∧ n1 = undef ∧ n2 = undef∧
n3 = 10 ∧ n4 = undef ∧ f = undef ∧ n5 = 10 ∧ n6 = 90 ‖
∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX] ∗ setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .]
‖ I .= `sf :LS}
if this ∈ LV(Σpos) then [Algorithm1− line7]
this ∈ LV(∃obj · obj 7→ [x : 10, setX : OsetX]∗
setX 7→ [@this : locw,n : 90, x = 90 . . .])
if window ∈ Reach(∆pos) then return SAFE [Algorithm1− line10]
window ∈ {obj, setX} ∪ {x, SetX} ∪ {this, n, x}
Figure 5.12: Algorithm Application for Case Study C (Phase 3)
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5.2.4 Case Study D
The case study D employs an ”eval” function to perform malicious codes. The sec-
tion 2.2.1 presents the dangerous of using the eval function. Figure 5.13 shows that
a JavaScript example which contains a global variable x, name, a function f , and an
eval function. The function f is composed of a conditional statement that returns ei-
ther g(10) or the value of this. The function eval declares a global function g. Since
a function invocation f(20) returns the global object window, the attack codes can be
executed by the setT imeout 1 function after zero milliseconds.
1 <s c r i p t type=” text / j a v a s c r i p t ”>
2 var x = 10 ;
3 var name = ”David” ;
4
5 f = func t i on (n) {
6 i f ( n <= 10 ) {
7 return g ( 1 0 ) ; }
8 e l s e {
9 return t h i s ; } ;
10 } ;
11
12 document . wr i t e (name + ’ has the number : ’+ x∗x ) ” ) ;
13 eva l ( ”g=func t i on ( x ) { re turn ( x∗x /2) }” ) ;
14 f ( 2 0 ) . setTimeout ( ” a l e r t ( ” attack code ” ) ” , 0 ) ;
15 </s c r i p t>
Figure 5.13: JavaScript for Case Study D
Phase 1: Program translation
The input is the given JavaScript program showed in Figure 5.13. The output is a
translated JS tsl program (see Figure 5.14) in a semantic preserving way. Because
the constructor eval is not valid in the JS tsl , the translation is finished after the
declaration of function f .
1The function setT imeout(code,milliseconds) defines that an evaluation of code after a specified
number of milliseconds.
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1 x = 10 ;
2 name = ”David” ;
3
4 f = func t i on (n) {
5 i f ( n <= 10 ) {
6 return g (10)}
7 e l s e {
8 return t h i s }
9 } ;
Figure 5.14: JS tsl for Case Study D (Phase 1)
Phase 2: Program Analysis
The given specifications that are requested to be proved are given as:
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
C
{x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ∧ res = window ‖ f 7→ Of ∗ g 7→ Og ‖ I′}
where C is a sequence of JS tsl programs.
In order to assist the proof in the later phases, the definition of Of and Og are:
• Of represents the function object referred to by f.
Of = [body : {if(n <= 10) return g(10);
else return this; },
params : (n),@proto : OProto]
• Og represents the function object referred to g.
Og = [body : return (x ∗ x/2),
params : (x),@proto : OProto]
Figure 5.15 shows that the analysis process contains the application of inference
rule [sl-glob-assign1], [sl-glob-assign2]. Because the framework JS tsl does not provide
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inference rule for the constructor eval function, the analysis is finished after the
declaration of function f . A summary of output in this phase is a final postcon-
dition assertion and is {true ∧ x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ‖ ∃f · f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .=
LS(f.@scope)}.
{true ‖ emp ‖ I}
x = 10; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = 10 ‖ emp ‖ I}
name = ”David”; [sl-glob-assign1]
{true ∧ x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ‖ emp ‖ I}
f = func(n){Of}; [sl-glob-assign2]
{true ∧ x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ‖ ∃f · f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
Figure 5.15: Program Analysis for Case Study D (Phase 2)
Phase 3: Algorithm Application
In this phase, the parameter ∆pre and ∆pos of algorithm SAFE THIS(C,∆pre,∆pos)
are shown as:
∆pre = {true ‖ emp ‖ I}
∆pos = {true ∧ x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ‖ ∃f · f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}
Figure 5.16 shows that the procedure Execu SAFE THIS executes the codes on
line2, line3 of the algorithm. It starts from the line2 ([Algorithm1-line2 ]). As the
∆pos is not satisfied the given specification that is provided in the phase 1, ∆pos
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returns false ([Algorithm1-line2 ]). The algorithm1 produces the results fail.
Phase 4: Result
Therefore, the framework is not able to deal the given program and show whether
it is safe.
procedure Execu SAFE THIS(c,∆pre, ∆pos)
if {∆pre} c {∆pos} then [Algorithm1− line2]
if {true ‖ emp ‖ I}}c{true ∧ x = 10 ∧ name = ”David” ‖
∃f · f 7→ Of ‖ I′ .= LS(f.@scope)}then
if ∆pos = false then return fail [Algorithm1− line3]
fail
Figure 5.16: Algorithm Application for Case Study D (Phase 3)
5.3 Evaluation
This section presents analysis of results from the evaluation of case studies and an
evaluation of JS tsl framework.
5.3.1 Analysis of Case Studies
To measure the performance of JS tsl framework on the case studies, Table 5.1 shows
the summarised results from the evaluation. There are three significant results. First,
the program logic in the JS tsl framework is able to model the core features including
objects, functions, fields, and the complex features such as alias, prototype inheritance,
scope chain. Table 5.1 gives a statistics on the number of functions, fields, and alias over
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the the number of objects. The count of objects and fields shows how frequent is the
update of value of a field and the changing of prototype chains. The count of functions
shows how frequent is the changing of scope chains.
The second significant result is the discovery of unsafe programs. The JS tsl frame-
work adapts to analyse the program that explicitly manipulates the this variable. There
are three testing cases (A, B, and C) that have been detected unsafe operations since the
analysis of program shows that this variable is pointing to the global object window.
For those three cases, they are proved functional correctness and safety property by at
least applying seven inference rules from the JS tsl framework. Note that, a third party
guest code has the same priority to be executed as the host code that it is embedded
in. A third party code can be intentionally embedded in a host code to manipulate the
global object maliciously. A host code may unintentionally change the value of this to
window without the interference of a guest code. The JS tsl framework is not only able
to discover the direct malicious codes from a third party, but also can detect the indirect
innocent codes from a host. In the row of Safety from Table 5.1, it shows that in the
Case B and C, the framework produces NOT SAFE results due to the change of this
value to window. In the Case A, it produces SAFE as the this value remains being
obj. The Case D is not applicable by the framework because the testing case contains
eval constructor that is illegal in the syntax of JS tsl .
The third significant result is the ability of JS tsl framework to be used to anal-
yse and detect malicious websites automatically. This can be presented by the row of
No. of Rule Applied and the Unsafe Discovered from Table 5.1. According to the rea-
soning by a set of inference rules from the JS tsl framework, it can automatically detect
that the Case A is safe, both Case B and C are not safe, and Case C is not applicable.
However, the suggested correction for these unsafe cases are beyond the capability of
framework.
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Case A Case B Case C Case D
No. of LOC 18 14 11 15
No. of Objects 11 7 10 7
No. of Functions
(Func./Obj.)
2 (18%) 2 (28%) 3 (30%) 2 (29%)
No. of F ields
(Field/Obj.)
7 (64%) 4 (57%) 6 (60%) 3 (43%)
No. of Alias
(Alias/Obj.)
1 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (10%) 0 (0%)
No. of Prototype Chain 3 1 2 2
No. of Scope Chain 3 1 2 2
No. of Rule Applied 9 9 7 3
Algorithm Applicable Yes Yes Yes No
Functional Correctness Yes Yes Yes N/A
Safety Yes No No N/A
Unsafe Discovered Yes Yes Yes N/A
Table 5.1: Summary of Case Studies
5.3.2 Evaluation of JS tsl Framework
To evaluate the JS tsl framework, a comparison table is presented in Table 5.2 to
show the difference of this framework with other frameworks from the literature that
have been discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. This section is an evaluation of the
framework JS tsl .
The evaluation is measured by two parts, the features that the framework can deal
with and the problems it can resolve. In Table 5.2, the first part evaluation presents
which frameworks can manipulate which language features by symbols. Symbol ”4”
and ”8” indicate that a framework can manipulate and cannot manipulate a feature re-
spectively. An ambiguous result is indicated by a symbol ”?”. The table highlights the
percentage of applicable features over the total 22 features. There are four frameworks
that have more than 80% features covered, Guh10, Maf09, Gar12, and JS tsl . The sec-
ond part evaluation presents which frameworks can solve which problems. For these four
frameworks, Guh10 covers 82% of features of the language who does not have any solu-
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tions. Maf09 that covers 82% of the features of the language solves the capability leak
and safety breach problem. Although the Gar12 has the highest feature coverage 90%,
it only proves the functional correctness property. The JS tsl framework has 82% of
feature coverage, and prove both the functional correctness and safety properties.
For all the frameworks in Table 5.2, there are three frameworks that are chosen
for further comparing evaluation, ADsafe , Dar12, and Gar12. Because ADsafe is
the most widely application, Dar12 solves the most number of problem, and Gar12
has the highest features coverage. However, JS tsl framework produces more features
coverage than ADsafe and Dar12, and it solves more problems than Gar12. Although
Dar12 is designed to be a more robust language, but it has not been widely applied in
popular browsers. The JS tsl framework is constructed based on JavaScript, which fits
the browsers naturally. Gar12 provides better features coverage than JS tsl , and it uses
a program logic for verifying the functional correctness of JavaScript, but JS tsl can be
used to verify not only the functional correctness but also the safety property.
140
5
.3
E
v
a
lu
a
tio
n
Frameworks and Solutions
ADSafe And05 Yu07 Jen09 Chu09 Sax10 Guh10 Dar12 Maf09 Rei07 Gua09 Dew10 Gar12 JS tsl
Features
Obj Creation
Obj Literal 4 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 ? 4 4
Obj ”new” Crt. 4 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 ? 4 4
Function
Function Declar. 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 4 ? 4 8
Function Expre. 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ? 4 4
Method Call 4 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 8 ? 4 4
Global Call 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Nested Func. 4 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Field
Field Crt. 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Field Lookup 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Field Mutation 4 4 8 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Variable
Global Assign. 8 4 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4 4
Local Assign. 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4 4
Expre. Return 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
With 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 ? 4 8
Eval 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 8 ? 4 8
”this” Keyword 8 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Array 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 ? 8 8
Iteration 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Conditional 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Prototype Inherit. 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4
Scope Chain 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 ? 4 4
Alias 8 4 8 8 4 8 8 4 8 4 4 ? 8 4
Total No. of Features 13 10 5 11 15 10 18 16 18 15 12 ? 20 18
(Total No. of Features/22) % 59% 45% 23% 50% 68% 45% 82% 73% 82% 68% 56% ? 90% 82%
Problem
Functional Correctness 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4
Memory Leak 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8
Capability Leak 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 ?
Safety Breach 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 4
(Total No. of Problems/4) % 0% 0% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0% 75% 50% 50% 50% 25% 25% 50%
Table 5.2: JS tsl vs. other frameworks
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5.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the analysis and evaluation of JS tsl framework. The
analysis results are obtained from the case studies, they show that the program logic
designed in the JS tsl can manipulate major features of JavaScript language, including
object, function, field, alias, prototype chain, and scope chain. The program logic can
be used to verify the functional correctness and safety property of program. They also
reveal that the framework can discover unsafe programs that have potential to inject
malicious code.
By comparing the JS tsl with the state of art in formal frameworks for JavaScript, it
shows that the JS tsl has rich language features coverage. The critical property functional
correctness and safety can be verified by the JS tsl . The memory leak is not reflected be-
cause the JS tsl only focus on the safety issue of program rather than a memory problem.
The JS tsl only can be used to partially solve the capability leak.
In summary, the results of this analysis and evaluation show that the JS tsl framework
is capable of verifying the functional correctness and safety for a suitable subset of
JavaScript program.
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Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This thesis has built a framework for verifying both functional correctness and safety
of a subset of JavaScript programs. As introduced in Chapter 1, JavaScript has been
widely used to develop third party applications on websites. Research has shown that a
malicious third party application is capable of attacking host pages through JavaScript
applications, it is necessary to build up a framework to improve the safety of the program
for websites.
However, research to date has focused on analysing dynamic features of JavaScript.
For example, some work aims to define a memory model and construct operational
semantics to model JavaScript. Other research concentrates on proposing type systems
for JavaScript that are accompanied by semantics. These systems can distinguish the
implicit types of objects. However, these semantics are defined for a small subset of
JavaScript. There is work on how to create systems for solving the problem of detecting
client-side code injection vulnerability. These systems can effectively detect bugs and
vulnerabilities, but are designed with less expressive subset language. There is also
research on building up a program logic to systematically verify the functional correctness
of a much more expressive subset of JavaScript. This research utilises separation logic
to model program specification that is used to formally verify the functional correctness
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of program. Nevertheless, no work has constructed a framework to consistently verify
the safety property of a comprehensive subset of JavaScript.
This thesis fills in the gap and aims at proposing an effective framework for verifying
the functional correctness and safety of a suitable subset of JavaScript and proving the
soundness of it.
6.2 Contribution
The research in this thesis reviewed the dynamic features of JavaScript. As discussed
in Chapter 2, all JavaScript programs have the features of loose typing, objects, func-
tions, closures, prototype inheritance and scope chain. These features take the safety
issues as the cost to enrich the interactions between websites and clients. The state-
of-the-art of detecting vulnerability on the third party JavaScript applications reviewed
the mainstream approaches, including a new language development, program rewriting
isolation, sandbox virtual machine, statically verified containment.
The JSsl framework, which was proposed in Chapter 3, defined a suitable subset
of JavaScript that has pointer-based data structures. It captures the core features of
of JavaScript, including prototype inheritance, function object, and automatic object
amplifying on the fly. The functional correctness verification of the JSsl programs was
achieved by employing the operational semantics, the specification language Specsl and
the set of inference rules. The specification language was developed based on a variant
of separation logic. The soundness of the axiomatic system that consists of the language
Specsl and the inference rules was proved with respect to the underlying operational
semantics.
Safety issues are caused by the this variable, the JS tsl framework, which was de-
scribed in Chapter 4, enriched the subset JSsl to include the this variable. It can deal
with larger subset language with the update of corresponding operational semantics,
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the specification language and inference rules. This framework not only can verify the
functional correctness of the JS tsl programs, but also verify the safety property. The
impact of adding this variable to language was considered and presented in terms of
the updated operational semantics, the Spectsl specification language, and the updated
inference rules. More features that the Spectsl language can manage more than Specsl are
alias, scope chain, and this variable. The soundness of this framework was proved with
respect to the updated underlying operational semantics. The SAFE THIS algorithm
was constructed to produce the detection result of safety for programs.
The evaluation of the JS tsl framework in Chapter 5 firstly employed four different
case studies. The results showed that the JS tsl framework not only detect the malicious
third party applications, but also can identify the innocent applications on host websites.
Secondly, the evaluation compared the expressiveness of the subset of JavaScript with
the state-of-the-art of the frameworks which are used to analyse the dynamic features
of JavaScript or detect vulnerabilities. The results showed that the JS tsl framework has
rich language features, and can effectively verify the functional correctness and safety of
programs.
6.3 Criteria for Success
A number of criteria for success of the research were specified in Section 1.4. This
section discusses the achievement of these criteria.
1. Definition of a suitable and a safe subset of JavaScript
The subsets of JavaScript in this thesis are called JSsl and JS
t
sl . As described in
Section 3.2, JSsl was constructed based on JavaScript conventions. Section 4.4.1
showed that the JS tsl was constructed to include more characteristics than have
been identified by the research on program safety. Both subsets languages have
the essential properties of the JavaScript programming language that can be used
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to develop third party applications on websites.
2. Define Operational and Axiomatic semantics of the JavaScript subset
The operational semantics of JSsl and JS
t
sl subset languages were defined in Sec-
tion 3.4 and Section 4.4.1 respectivelyly. To capture program correctness, the
specification language Specsl in Section 3.5.1, based on separation logic, allows
users to define predicates to specify program correctness that they would like to
verify. Another specification language Spectsl was developed in Section 4.4.3 as
an extension of Specsl , which can deal with alias, scope chain and the this vari-
able of the JS tsl language. It allows users to define predicates to specify safety
property. Both specification languages were developed under the same semantic
domain. The underlying axiomatic semantics in Section 3.5.2 and Section 4.4.6
were constructed to automatically reason about programs with logic assertions.
3. Definition of safety verification algorithm
Section 4.4.5 formally defined safe property of programs. Section 4.4.4 showed
that the Safe This algorithm has the ability of identifying safe and unsafe programs.
Chapter 5 chose four case studies and applied the algorithm for evaluation. The
results in Section 5.2 showed that the algorithm can analyse assertions that are
produced under axiomatic semantics and produce safe or unsafe results for users.
4. Proofs of program written in the JavaScript subset
The soundness proof of the framework JSsl and JS
t
sl were presented in Appendix
A and Appendix B respectively. Both frameworks were proved to be sound with
respect to the underlying operational semantics in Section 3.4.2 and Section 4.4.2.
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6.4 Future Work
The proposed frameworks in this thesis has achieved the intended goals, but there
are still many potential aspects that can be extended in the future to make a good use
of them as follows:
1. Integration with DOM
The JS tsl framework can be extended and applied to a large body of programs on
client-side web programming, such as DOM objects. As the DOM originated as
a specification to allow JavaScript scripts to be portable among Web browsers, it
provides a structural representation of the document and assist users to modify
its content and visual presentation by using JavaScript. It is observed that comb-
ing JavaScript with DOM objects cannot be detected by any automated static
analysis. Therefore, in the future, the JS tsl framework can be expanded to prevent
vulnerabilities that are derived from the cooperation between DOM and JavaScript
from attacking websites.
2. Fully implemented with JavaScript libraries
With the expanded demands for JavaScript, the development of user interfaces
for applications on websites is needed. JavaScript library including Prototype,
jQuery, and JavaScript widget libraries such as Dojo, Y UI have been constructed
to provide platforms for assisting developers. Thus, the JS tsl framework can be
expanded to integrated with these libraries and improve the safety of programs
written by them.
3. Employ new features
Although the JS tsl framework can deal with most of the features of JavaScript, the
challenging features such as eval and with have not been considered to be adopted
into the framework. However, the use of eval is frequent and has potential of
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invalidating any results obtained by static analysis, and many frameworks ignore
such feature. More challenging features can be enriched in the JS tsl in the future.
And the soundness proof results can be extended compositionally to include more
sophisticated reasoning about ”eval” and ”with” constructors.
4. Compatibility in ECMScript 5
The JS tsl framework is developed under the ECMScript 3 conventions, but the
latest ECMScript 5 provides interesting features. It would be interesting to reason
about the new features and find the connection with ECMScript 3.
6.5 Summary
This chapter summarised the entire thesis with its achieved results and potential
aspects of improvement. The results present the solution to develop a verification frame-
work of heap-manipulating script programs with functional correctness and safety prop-
erties verification, respectively. The case studies and comparison evaluation have shown
that the JS tsl framework has given an improvement in detecting malicious scripts that
run on websites. Evidently, the framework provides opportunity for further enhance-
ment for future research, including the integration with DOM, implementation with
JavaScript libraries, manipulation new features, compatibility in ECMScript 5. These
facets depict a roadmap for future work.
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Appdx A
From the perspective of backwards reasoning, an axiomatic rule is utilised according
to the structure of c, and premises need to be verified with similar backward verifications
until all the premises are axioms or known facts. In the following cases are organised
according to the structure of c.
- Case (skip).
{Π ‖ Σ}skip{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-skip]
Since skip, (s, h)→ (s, h), it is easy to see that rule skip is sound in JSsl framework.
-Case (glob-assign1).
{Π[e/x] ‖ Σ}x = e{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-glob-assign1]
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Take any σ such that s, h |= Π[e/x] ‖ Σ. We have that x = e, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ v], h).
The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ‖ Σ.
As expression e is in the stack having value v, s(e) = v, then we have that s[e 7→ v].
Therefore, state s[e 7→ v], h |= Π[e/x] ‖ Σ. If we replace variable e with variable x, then
we will always have that that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ‖ Σ.
-Case (local-assign1).
{Π ‖ Σ[e/x]}var x = e{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-local-assign1]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ[e/x]. We have that var x = e, (s, h)→ (s, h[` 7→
r[x 7→ v]]). The goal is to prove that s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] |= Π ‖ Σ.
As local assignment var x = e is declared inside of a function, location ` in the
heap contains a record that contains the value v of variable x, thus s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→
v]] |= Π ‖ Σ[e/x]. In the case of x = e, we replace e with the variable x, then
s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] |= Π ‖ Σ
-Case (glob-assign2)
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
{Π ‖ emp}x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ ∃x · x7→r}
[sl-glob-assign2]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ emp. Then we have that x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c},
(s, h) → s[x 7→`], h[` 7→r]. The goal is to prove that s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r] |= Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r.
We start from an empty heap, s, h |= emp, thus dom(h) = ∅. After we create a
global function x, the location of the function stores in the stack, the function body,
parameters and internal prototype pointer store in the record r in the heap. Thus, we
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have that h = [x 7→ r], and s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r] |= x 7→ r. Therefore, we will always have
that s[x7→`], h[` 7→r] |= Π ‖ x7→r.
-Case (local-assign2)
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x0 7→ r0 x0 ∈ Func
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop] x /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r)}
[sl-local-assign2]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. Then we have that var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c},
(s, h) → s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→ `]]). The goal is to prove that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→ `]] |= Π ‖
Σ ∗ (∃x · x7→r).
We start from an empty heap, s, h |= emp, thus dom(h) = ∅. After we create a
global function x, the location of the function stores in the stack, the function body,
parameters and internal prototype pointer store in the record r in the heap. Thus, we
have that h = [`0 7→r], and s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→ `]] |= x 7→ r. Therefore, we will always have
that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→ `]] |= Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r).
-Case (lookup-field)
r = [..., f : v, ...]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r}x = x′.f{(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}
[sl-lookup-field]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r. We have that x = x′.f, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ v], h).
The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ v], h |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r.
As we know that object x′ has field f with value v stored in the record r. In the
stack, it keeps the value v or the reference v if v is a primitive value or a reference type
value respectively. Thus we have that s[x 7→ v] |= (∃x · Π) ∧ x=v. Therefore, we will
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always have that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r.
-Case (lookup-proto)
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) f /∈ dom(r)
r(@proto) = x′′ {Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.f{Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ}x = x′.f{Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′}
[sl-lookup-proto]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ. We have that x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s′, h′).
The goal is to prove that s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′.
As we know that the object x′ is not a live variable in Σ′, and the record of x′ does not
own the field f , but it would follow its prototype pointer @proto to evaluate f in its pro-
totype object x′′. In the case of s, h1 |= Σ′, and s, h2 |= x′ 7→ r, it shares the similar proof
with the rule of [sl-lookup-field]. Therefore we will always have that s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r∗Σ′.
-Case (lookup-undef)
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
f /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.f{∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ}
[sl-lookup-undef]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. We have that x = x′.f, (s, h) 7→ (s[x 7→
undef], h). The goal is to prove that (s[x 7→ undef], h) |= ∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ.
Because even the object OProto does not have that the field f . The heap does not
modified but we add to the stack with [x 7→ undef]. Thus we have that s[x 7→ undef] |=
∃x·Π∧x=undef. Therefore, we will always have that s[x 7→ undef], h |= ∃x·Π∧x=undef ‖
Σ.
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-Case (mutate-field)
r = [..., f : v, ...] or else f /∈ dom(r)
{Π ‖ x 7→r}x.f = ee{Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee]}
[sl-mutate-field]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x7→r. We have that x.f = ee, (s, h)→ (s, h[ 7`→r[f 7→v]]).
The goal is to prove that s, h |= [ 7`→r[f 7→v]] |= Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee].
We know that there is x 7→ ` in the stack, ` 7→ r in the heap. Thus we have that
h[` 7→ r[f 7→ s(ee)] |= x 7→ r[f 7→ ee]. The evaluation of the expression ee is the
value v, thus we update the expression s(ee) to v. Therefore we will always have that
s, h[ 7`→r[f 7→v]] |= Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee].
-Case (return)
{Π[e/result] ‖ Σ}return e{Π ‖ Σ} [sl-return]
The proof for rule [sl-return] shares the same proof of the [sl-glob-assign1].
-Case (fun-call-obj)
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..] ∗ x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...]
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this : x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2}
[sl-fun-call-obj]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. We have that x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) →
(s1, h2). The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2.
We know that s, h |= Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..] ∗ x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...].
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Thus we have that the function x0 stored in a record in the heap, and this record is
referenced by the object x′. In the case of h2 = h h1 and s1 = s[x 7→ s(´result)], af-
ter the execution of function body c, then we have that s1 |= ∃x · Π) ∧ x = res, and
h2 |= Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this : x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]. Therefore, we will always have that
s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2.
-Case (fun-call-proto)
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) x0 /∈ dom(r) r(@proto) = x′′
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
[sl-fun-call-proto]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r∗Σ. We have that x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h)→
(s′, h′). The goal is to prove that s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ Σ′.
As we know that the function x0 cannot be located in the object x
′, thus by follow-
ing the internal property @proto, it leads to the location of the object x′′ that is the
prototype of x′. Then, the rest proof shares the similarity with the rule of [sl-fun-call-obj].
Therefore we will always have that (s′, h′) |= Π′ ‖ Σ′.
-Case (func-undef)
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
x0 /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ}
[sl-fun-undef]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. We have that x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) →
(s[x 7→ undef], h). The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ undef], h |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ.
As we know that the function x0 cannot even be found in the object OProto, thus the
function invocation returns undef value. Then we have that s[x 7→ undef] |= (∃x · Π) ∧
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x=undef. Therefore, we will always have that s[x 7→ undef], h |= (∃x ·Π)∧ x=undef ‖ Σ.
-Case (fun-call-dir)
Σ ≡ (Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1...xn),@proto:locfp, ...])
Σ1 ≡ (Σ ∗ x′ 7→ [this : locw, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2}
[sl-fun-call-dir]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. Then we have that x = f(e1, ..., en), (s, h)→ (s1, h2).
The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2.
We know s, h |= Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto 7→locfp]. Thus,
s, h |= x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto 7→locfp]. As the function x0 stores in
the heap, after the function invocation, it executes the function body c, then the heap
h2 |= Σ2. As we also have that s |= Π1, and x 7→ s′(result) in s1. Thus x = result.
According to {Π ‖ Σ}c{Π1 ‖ Σ1}, we have that s1 |= (∃x · Π1) ∧ x = res and h2 |= Σ2.
Therefore we will always have that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2.
-Case (obj-crt-literal)
r = [f1 : e1, ..., fn : en]
{Π ‖ emp} x = {f1 : e1, .., fn : en} {Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r}
[sl-obj-crt-literal]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ emp. Then we have that x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn :
een}, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r]). The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r] |= Π ‖
∃x · x 7→r.
As we know that the object x is stored in the location ` in the heap, thus we have
that s[x 7→ `] |= Π. The record r is used to keep the literal fields and values for object x
in the heap, thus h(`) = [f1 : ee1, ..., fn = een]. Then we have that h[` 7→ r] |= ∃x ·x 7→r.
155
Therefore we will always have that (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r]) |= Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r.
-Case (obj-crt-proto)
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r} x = new x′() {Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ (∃x · x 7→[@proto : x′])} [sl-obj-crt-new]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r. We have that x = new x′, (s, h) → (s[x 7→
`], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′]]). The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′] |= Π ‖
x 7→[@proto : x′] ∗ x′ 7→r.
In the case of h1 = h, h2 = (` 7→ [@proto : `′]), we only need to prove that (s, h2) |=
{x 7→ [@proto : x′]}. Because dom(h) = s(x), and h(s(x)) = [...,@proto : x′, ...], thus we
will always have that (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′]) |= Π ‖ x 7→[@proto : x′] ∗ x′ 7→r.
-Case (obj-crt-fun-construct)
Σ ≡ (Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto:locop, this:locw])
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ (∃x′′ · x′′ 7→ [this : x, x1 : e1, ...xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}x = new x′([e1, ..., en]){Π1 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-obj-crt-fun]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. We have that x = new x′(e1, .., en), (s, h) →
(s1, h2). The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= Π1 ‖ Σ2.
When we create an object by function constructor, the proof can be similar com-
pleted in the similar way as that of rule [sl-fun-call-obj]. The only difference is that this
keyword points to global objet before x = new x′(e1, .., en) execution and points to newly
created object x after the execution.
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-Case (sequential, conditional)
{Π ‖ Σ}c1{Π1 ‖ Σ1} {Π1 ‖ Σ1}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}c1; c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-sequential]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ}c1{Π2 ‖ Σ2} {Π∧¬b ‖ Σ}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
{Π ‖ Σ}if (b){c1}else {c2}{Π2 ‖ Σ2}
[sl-conditional]
The proof for rule (sequential, conditional) are classical and can be simply followed
the Hoare Logic’s proof using sequencing axiom and condition axiom respectively. Thus
they are omitted here.
-Case (iteration)
{Π∧b ‖ Σ}c{Π ‖ Σ}
{Π ‖ Σ}while (b){c}{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ}
[sl-iteration]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ. When s(b) is false, then s(b) = false, we can
easily have that s, h |= Π∧¬b ‖ Σ. When s(b) is true, it keeps looping until s(b) becomes
false. Thus we will always have that s, h |= Π∧¬b ‖ Σ.
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Appendix B
Appdx B
Compared with the semantics of Specsl specification language, Spec
t
sl updated its
semantic model in terms of abstract state, alias, and scope Chain. The additional
semantic model and logic predicate for scope chain was shown in Figure 4.16 and Figure
4.17, respectively.
From the perspective of backwards reasoning, an axiomatic rule is utilised according
to the structure of c, and premises need to be verified with similar backward verifications
until all the premises are axioms or known facts. In the following cases are organised
according to the structure of c.
- Case (skip).
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}skip{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-skip]
Since skip, (s, h)→ (s, h), it is easy to see that rule skip is sound in JS tsl framework.
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-Case (glob-assign1).
{Π[e/x] ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = e{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-glob-assign1]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π[e/x] ‖ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π[e/x] ‖ Σ and s, h |= LS.
We have that x = e, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ v], h). The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ‖
Σ ‖ I.
As expression e is in the stack having value v, s(e) = v, then we have that s[e 7→ v].
Therefore, state s[e 7→ v], h |= Π[e/x] ‖ Σ. If we replace variable e with variable x, then
we will have that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ‖ Σ. And we know s, h |= LS, therefore we will have
that s[x 7→ v], h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I.
-Case (local-assign1).
{Π ‖ Σ[e/x] ‖ I .= LS}var x = e{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS} [sl-local-assign1]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ[e/x] ‖ I, then s, h |= Π ‖ Σ[e/x], and s, h |= LS.
We have that var x = e, (s, h) → (s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]]). The goal is to prove that
s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I.
As local assignment var x = e is declared inside of a function, location ` in the heap
contains a record that contains the value v of variable x, thus s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] |= Π ‖
Σ[e/x]. In the case of x = e, we replace e with the variable x, and we know s, h |= LS
then we will always have that s, h[` 7→ r[x 7→ v]] |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I
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-Case (glob-assign2)
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
{Π ‖ emp ‖ I .= LS}x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-glob-assign2]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ emp ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ emp, and s, h |= I. We
have that x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h)→ s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r]. The goal is to prove that
s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r] |= Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I′.
We start from an empty heap, s, h |= emp, thus dom(h) = ∅. After we create a
global function x, the location of the function stores in the stack, the function body,
parameters and internal prototype pointer store in the record r in the heap. Thus, we
have that h = [x 7→ r], and s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r] |= x 7→ r. Then I′ .= `sx : LS, thus we have
that s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r] |= α([LLS′], `sx : LS, x, `s). Therefore, we will always have that
s[x 7→`], h[ 7`→r] |= Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I′.
-Case (local-assign2)
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x0 7→ r0 x0 ∈ Func
r = [body : c,params : (x1, ..., xn),@proto : locop]
x /∈ LV(Σ) I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}{Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r) ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-local-assign2]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ emp ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ emp, and s, h |= I. We
have that var x = func[F ](x1, ..., xn){c}, (s, h)→ s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→`]]. The goal is to prove
that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→`]] |= Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x 7→r) ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope).
We start from an empty heap, s, h |= emp, thus dom(h) = ∅. As we know that in
the heap we have the location `0 that is the location of a existing function variable x0
pointing to its record r. After we create a local function x inside of the function x0,
160
it creates data structure in the record r, which is the function variable x pointing to
the location `. The location ` has the function body, parameters and internal prototype
pointer of the variable x. Thus, we have that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→`]] |= x 7→ r.
Then I′ .= `sx : LS, thus we have that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→`]] |= α([LLS′], `sx : LS, x, `s).
Therefore, we will always have that s, h[`0 7→r[x 7→`]] |= Π ‖ Σ ∗ (∃x · x7→r) ‖ I′ .=
LS(x.@scope).
-Case (lookup-field)
r = [..., f : v, ...]
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-field]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r and s, h |= I.
We have that x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ v], h). The goal is to prove that s[x 7→ v], h |=
(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I.
As we know that object x′ has field f with value v stored in the record r. In the
stack, it keeps the value v or the reference v if v is a primitive value or a reference type
value respectively. Thus we have that s[x 7→ v] |= (∃x · Π) ∧ x=v. Then we will have
that s[x 7→ v], h |= {Π ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r}. And we know s, h |= I, therefore we will always
have that s[x 7→ v], h |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=v ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I.
-Case (lookup-proto)
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) f /∈ dom(r)
r(@proto) = x′′ {Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.f{Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-proto]
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Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ ‖ I, then s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ,
and s, h |= I. We have that x = x′.f, (s, h) → (s′, h′). The goal is to prove that
s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′ ‖ I.
As we know that the object x′ is not a live variable in Σ′, and the record of x′ does
not own the field f , but it would follow its prototype pointer @proto to evaluate f in
its prototype object x′′. In the case of s, h1 |= {Σ′}, and s, h2 |= {x′ 7→ r}, it shares the
similar proof with the rule of [sl-lookup-field]. And we always have s, h |= I. Therefore
we will always have that s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ Σ′ ‖ I.
-Case (lookup-undef)
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
f /∈ LV(Σ)
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.f{∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-lookup-undef]
Take any σ such that (s, h) |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, and s, h |= I. We have
that x = x′.f, (s, h) 7→ (s[x 7→ undef], h). The goal is to prove that (s[x 7→ undef], h) |=
∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I.
Because even the object OProto does not have that the field f . The heap does not
modified but we add to the stack with [x 7→ undef]. Thus we have that s[x 7→ undef] |=
∃x · Π ∧ x=undef. And we always have s, h |= I. Therefore, we will always have that
s[x 7→ undef], h |= ∃x ·Π ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I.
-Case (mutate-field)
r = [..., f : v, ...] or else f /∈ dom(r)
{Π ‖ x 7→r ‖ I .= LS}x.f = ee{Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee] ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-mutate-field]
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Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x 7→r ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ x 7→ r, and s, h |= I.
We have that e.f = ee, (s, h) → (s, h[` 7→ [f 7→ v]]). The goal is to prove that s, h |=
[ 7`→r[f 7→v]] |= Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee] ‖ I.
We know that there is x 7→ ` in the stack, ` 7→ r in the heap. Thus we have that
h[` 7→ r[f 7→ s(ee)] |= x 7→ r[f 7→ ee]. The evaluation of the expression ee is the value
v, thus we update the expression s(ee) to v. And we always have s, h |= I. Therefore we
will always have that s, h[` 7→r[f 7→v]] |= Π ‖ x 7→r[f 7→ee] ‖ I.
-Case (fun-call-obj)
Σ ≡ Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..] ∗ x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...]
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this: x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2} I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I′ .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-obj]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, and s, h |= I. We have that
x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h)→ (s1, h2). The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1)∧x =
res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I.
We know that s, h |= Σ0 ∗x′ 7→[x0:x′′, ..]∗x′′ 7→[body : c,params : (x1..xn), ...]. Thus
we have that the function x0 stored in a record in the heap, and this record is referenced
by the object x′. In the case of h2 = h h1 and s1 = s[x 7→ s(´result)], after the execution
of function body c, then we have that s1 |= ∃x ·Π)∧ x = res, and h2 |= Σ ∗ x0 7→ [this :
x′, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...]. And we know the location `sx0 : LS and always have s, h |= I.
Therefore, we will always have that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I.
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-Case (fun-call-proto)
x′ /∈ LV(Σ) x0 /∈ dom(r) r(@proto) = x′′ I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ}x = x′′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′}
{Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){Π′ ‖ Σ′ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-proto]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r ∗ Σ, and
s, h |= I. We have that x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h)→ (s′, h′). The goal is to prove that
s′, h′ |= Π′ ‖ Σ′ ‖ I.
As we know that the function x0 cannot be located in the object x
′, thus by follow-
ing the internal property @proto, it leads to the location of the object x′′ that is the
prototype of x′. Then, the rest proof shares the similarity with the rule of [sl-fun-call-obj].
And we know `sx0 : LSandalwayshaves, h |= I. Therefore we will always have that
(s′, h′) |= Π′ ‖ Σ′ ‖ I.
-Case (func-undef)
Σ ≡ x′ 7→ OProto
x1 /∈ LV(Σ) I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-fun-undef]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I,thus s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, and s, h |= I. We
have that x = x′.x0([e1, ..., en]), (s, h) → (s[x 7→ undef], h). The goal is to prove that
s[x 7→ undef], h |= {(∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ}.
As we know that the function x0 cannot even be found in the object OProto, thus
the function invocation returns undef value. Then we have that s[x 7→ undef] |=
(∃x · Π) ∧ x=undef. And we always have s, h |= I. Therefore, we will always have
that s[x 7→ undef], h |= (∃x ·Π) ∧ x=undef ‖ Σ ‖ I.
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-Case (fun-call-dir)
Σ ≡ (Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1...xn),@proto:locfp, ...])
Σ1 ≡ (Σ ∗ x′ 7→ [this: locw, x1 : e1, ..., xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1 ‖ I}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I1} I .= `sx0 :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = x0([e1, ..., en]){(∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-fun-call-dir]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, and s, h |= I. Then we have
that x = f(e1, ..., en), (s, h)→ (s1, h2). The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= {(∃x·Π1)∧x =
res ‖ Σ2}.
We know s, h |= Σ1 ∗ x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto 7→locfp]. Thus,
s, h |= x0 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto 7→locfp]. As the function x0 stores in
the heap, after the function invocation, it executes the function body c, then the heap
h2 |= Σ2. As we also have that s |= Π1, and x 7→ s′(result) in s1. Thus x = result.
According to {Π ‖ Σ}c{Π1 ‖ Σ1}, we have that s1 |= (∃x · Π1) ∧ x = res and h2 |= Σ2.
And we know that `sx0 : LS and always have s, h |= I. Therefore we will always have
that s1, h2 |= (∃x ·Π1) ∧ x = res ‖ Σ2 ‖ I.
-Case (obj-crt-literal)
r = [f1 : e1, ..., fn : en]
{Π ‖ emp ‖ I .= LS} x = {f1 : e1, .., fn : en} {Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I .= LS}
[sl-obj-crt-literal]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ emp ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ emp and s, h |= I. We
have that x = {f1 : ee1, ..., fn : een}, (s, h) → (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r]). The goal is to prove
that s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r] |= {Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r}.
As we know that the object x is stored in the location ` in the heap, thus we
have that s[x 7→ `] |= Π. The record r is used to keep the literal fields and values
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for object x in the heap, thus h(`) = [f1 : ee1, ..., fn = een]. Then we have that
h[` 7→ r] |= ∃x · x7→r. And we always have s, h |= I. Therefore we will always have that
(s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ r]) |= Π ‖ ∃x · x 7→r ‖ I.
-Case (obj-crt-proto)
{Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I .= LS} x = new x′() {Π ‖ x′ 7→r ∗ (∃x · x 7→[@proto : x′]) ‖ I .= LS} [sl-obj-crt-new]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→r ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ x′ 7→ r, and s, h |= I. We
have that x = new x′, (s, h)→ (s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′]]). The goal is to prove that
s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′] |= {Π ‖ x7→[@proto : x′] ∗ x′ 7→r}.
In the case of h1 = h, h2 = (` 7→ [@proto : `′]), we only need to prove that
(s, h2) |= {x 7→ [@proto : x′]}. Because dom(h) = s(x), and h(s(x)) = [...,@proto : x′, ...],
and we always have s, h |= I, thuswewillalwayshavethat(s[x 7→ `], h[` 7→ [@proto : `′]) |=
Π ‖ x 7→[@proto : x′] ∗ x′ 7→r ‖ I.
-Case (obj-crt-fun-construct)
Σ ≡ (Σ0 ∗ x′ 7→ [body : c,params : (x1..xn),@proto:locop,this:locw])
Σ1 ≡ Σ ∗ (∃x′′ · x′′ 7→ [this: x, x1 : e1, ...xn : en, ...])
{Π ‖ Σ1}c{Π1 ‖ Σ2} I .= `sx′ :LS
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}x = new x′([e1, ..., en]){Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I′ .= LS(x.@scope)}
[sl-obj-crt-fun]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I, thus s, h |= Π ‖ Σ, and s, h |= I. We have that
x = new x′(e1, .., en), (s, h)→ (s1, h2). The goal is to prove that s1, h2 |= Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I.
When we create an object by function constructor, the proof can be similar com-
pleted in the similar way as that of rule [sl-fun-call-obj]. The only difference is that this
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keyword points to global objet before x = new x′(e1, .., en) execution and points to newly
created object x after the execution. Because we always have s, h |= I, and the location
`sx′ : LS, therefore we will always have s1, h2 |= Π1 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I′.
-Case (sequential, conditional)
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1{Π1 ‖ Σ1 ‖ I1 .= LS}
{Π1 ‖ Σ1 ‖ I1 .= LS}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1; c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
[sl-sequential]
{Π∧b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c1{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c2{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}if (b){c1}else {c2}{Π2 ‖ Σ2 ‖ I2 .= LS}
[sl-conditional]
The proof for rule (sequential, conditional) are classical and can be simply followed
the Hoare Logic’s proof using sequencing axiom and condition axiom respectively. Thus
they are omitted here.
-Case (iteration)
{Π∧b ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}c{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I′ .= LS}
{Π ‖ Σ ‖ I .= LS}while (b){c}{Π∧¬b ‖ Σ ‖ I′ .= LS}
[sl-iteration]
Take any σ such that s, h |= Π ‖ Σ ‖ I. When s(b) is false, then s(b) = false, we
can easily have that s, h |= Π∧¬b ‖ ΣI. When s(b) is true, it keeps looping until s(b)
167
becomes false. Thus we will always have that s, h |= Π∧¬b ‖ Σ ‖ I′.
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